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Few issues in tort law are more in need of clarification than
those encompassed by the concepts of legal cause and duty, which
are not only the subject of "opaque, confused and contradictory"
treatments in the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law
of Torts,' relied upon by many American courts, but also the subject
of even more opaque and confused treatment in many foreign juris-
dictions.2 The focus of this conference is on tort law in the United
States, and my assigned task is to comment on the issues encom-
passed by the concept of legal cause, especially as they are or
should be treated in the Restatement. As anyone who is familiar
with the concept of legal cause will be aware, and as Jane Staple-
ton's article makes clear, an adequate discussion of the concept
must encompass not only the empirical issue of causal contribution
and the normative issue of the extent of legal responsibility for tor-
tiously caused consequences, but also the related concept of duty.
Thus, the assigned task covers an area that is broad and complex,
and it is made more difficult by the general failure, in the Restate-
ment and elsewhere, to properly distinguish and clarify the various
analytical, empirical, and normative issues that are confusingly and
even contradictorily lumped together in one or the other or all of
these legal concepts.
In her article, Stapleton comments on some of my prior arti-
cles, in which I undertook a detailed analysis of the empirical issue
of causal contribution and emphasized the importance of (1) distin-
guishing that issue from the prior issue of identifying tortious con-
duct and the subsequent issue of the extent of legal responsibility
for tortiously caused consequences; and (2) focusing the causal-
contribution inquiry on the tortious aspect of the defendant's con-
duct.3 While Stapleton and I agree on many basic points, we also
1. See Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Conse.
quences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 943 (2001).
2. See, e.g., March v. E. & M.H. Stramare Pty. Ltd., (1991) 99 A.L.R. 423; Sew Hoy & Sons
Ltd. v. Coopers & Lybrand, [1996] 1 N.Z.L.R. 392; Stapleton, supra note 1, at 949 n.21, 955 n.35;
Jane Stapleton, Perspectives on Causation, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, FOURTH
SERIES 61, 72, 75-76, 77-78 (Jeremy Horder ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2000) [hereinafter Staple-
ton, Perspectives]; Jane Stapleton, Unpacking "Causation," in RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY
(Peter Cane & John Gardner eds., forthcoming 2001).
3. See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1985) [hereinafter
Wright, Causation]; Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of
Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1985) [hereinafter Wright, Economic Analysis]; Rich-
ard W. Wright, The Efficiency Theory of Causation and Responsibility: Unscientific Formalism
and False Semantics, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 553 (1987) [hereinafter Wright, Efficiency Theory];
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disagree on some significant ones, as Stapleton herself notes. In the
following parts of this Article, I will quickly note the points of
agreement and spend more time on the points of disagreement, in
the hope of further narrowing our disagreements or at least clari-
fying the underlying issues. I will concentrate, once again, primar-
ily on the empirical issue of causal contribution and the importance
of distinguishing it from the normative issues of tortious conduct,
legal injury, and the extent of legal responsibility for tortiously
caused injuries. However, I will focus more than I have in the past
on the (mis)handling of these issues in the Restatement, while also
making a few comments about the Restatement's (mis)handling of
the issues of duty and the extent of legal responsibility for tor-
tiously caused consequences.
II. GENERAL CONCEPTS AND STRUCTURE
The Restatement's treatment of legal cause suffers from se-
rious conceptual and structural flaws. First, the concepts employed
by the Restatement fail to distinguish the empirical issue of causal
contribution from the normative issue of the proper extent of legal
responsibility for tortiously caused consequences.4 Second, the Re-
statement does not properly link the causal-contribution issue to
the prior tortious-conduct issue. Third, the Restatement's treat-
ments are insufficiently general, being elaborated only for the tort
of negligence. These problems will be discussed, in order, in the
following sections.
A. Distinguishing the Empirical Issue of Causal Contribution from
the Normative Issue of the Extent of Legal Responsibility for
Tortiously Caused Consequences
As Stapleton thoroughly documents,5 the Restatement fails
to distinguish the empirical issue of causal contribution from the
Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof-
Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L REV. 1001 (1988) [hereinafter
Wright, Bramble Bush]. See also Richard NV. Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Sev-
eral Liability, 23 MEM. ST. U. L REV. 45 (1992).
4. The causal-contribution and extent.of-responsibility issues arise not only in the prima
facie case against the defendant, but also in the defense of plaintiffs contributory negligence. To
avoid repeated awkward phrasings (e.g., "tortiously or negligently caused consequences"), I wil
generally discuss these issues in the context of the prima facie case against the defendant. The
analyses are the same in the defense of plaintiffs contributory negligence.
5. Stapleton, supra note 1, at 969-81.
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normative issue of the proper extent of legal responsibility for tor-
tiously caused consequences. The Restatement's failure to properly
distinguish these two issues is foreordained by its failure to employ
any concepts or phrases that distinguish them. The phrases that it
does employ, "legal cause" and "substantial factor," deliberately
merge the two issues.
1. "Legal Cause" and "Proximate Cause"
The Restatement employs the phrase "legal cause" as a sub-
stitute for the phrase "proximate cause," which traditionally has
been used by the courts. The word "cause" in each phrase is meant
(or should be meant) to refer to the empirical issue of causal contri-
bution, which is often called "actual causation" or "cause-in-fact,"
while the words "legal" and "proximate" in the two phrases are
meant to refer to the normative issue of the extent of legal respon-
sibility for tortiously caused consequences. However, none of these
embedded words is adequate for its intended purpose.
Even the word "cause" is too ambiguous to be used to distin-
guish the empirical issue of causal contribution from the normative
issue of the extent of legal responsibility for tortiously caused con-
sequences. As the Restatement itself recognizes,6 in ordinary use
the words "cause" and "responsibility" have ambiguous and over-
lapping meanings, sometimes referring merely to the empirical fact
of having contributed to a certain result, but at other times refer-
ring only to those contributing factors which are deemed to be most
significant given the context and purpose of the particular inquiry.
This is especially true for the phrase "the cause," but it also is true
for the phrase "a cause."
7
There are even greater problems with the words "legal" or
"proximate" as qualifiers to the word "cause." On the one hand, the
word "proximate" erroneously implies that a "proximate cause" of
some harm must be a cause that is spatially and temporally near,
or even nearest, to the harm.8 On the other hand, an empirical
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1965), quoted infra in text accom-
panying note 29.
7. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1741-50; Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note
3, at 1012-14.
8. The same problem exists with the word "remote," the antonym of "proximate," which is
applied to harms which are found to be beyond the extent of legal responsibility in the United
Kingdom and the British Commonwealth countries. See Stapleton, supra note 1, at 949 n.21;
Stapleton, Perspectives, supra note 2, at 78-79.
[Vol. 53:3:10711074
ONCE MORE INTO THE BRAMBLE BUSH
study found that almost one-fourth of the interviewed subjects
misinterpreted the phrase "proximate cause" as meaning an "ap-
proximate cause," an "estimated cause," or some fabrication. 9 To
avoid such common misinterpretations, the earlier Restatements
and some courts have replaced "proximate cause" with "legal
cause." However, the phrase "legal cause" is no more enlightening
nor less confusing than the phrase "proximate cause." The same
empirical study that found problems with the phrase "proximate
cause" also found that one-fourth of the interviewed subjects misin-
terpreted "legal cause" as being the opposite of an illegal cause. The
study therefore recommended "that the term 'legal cause' not be
used in jury instructions; instead, the simple term 'cause' should be
used, with the explanation that the law defines 'cause' in its own
particular way."10 The phrases "responsible cause" or "legally re-
sponsible cause" might be less misleading, but they are no more
helpful in specifying the relevant notion of responsibility and dis-
tinguishing it from the empirical issue of causal contribution.
2. "Substantial Factor"
The Restatement's basic section on legal cause, section 431,
states:
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and
(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner
in which his negligence has resulted in the harm."
9. See Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable-" A
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L REV. 1306, 1353 (1979).
10. Id. Relying in part on the cited empirical study, the California Supreme Court recently
threw out California's standard jury instruction on causation which contained the phrase
"proximate cause." See Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 876-79 (Cal. 1991). However, despite
also noting (i) the problems the study found with the phrase "legal cause" and (ii) the importance
of distinguishing the empirical issue of causal contribution C'cause-in-fact") from the normative
issue of the proper extent of responsibility for tortiously caused consequences, the court retained,
as an instruction supposedly limited to the issue of cause-in-fact, the standard jury instruction
on causation which included, inter alia, the phrase "legal cause." See id. For further discussion
of Mitchell, see infra note 12.
11. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 431 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
The general definitional section on "legal cause" seems to focus only on the issue addressed in
clause (b) of section 431:
The words "legal cause" are used ... to denote the fact that the causal sequence
by which the actor's tortious conduct has resulted in [a legally recognized in-
jury] is such that the law holds the actor responsible for such harm ....
2001] 1075
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At first glance, one might think that section 431 distinguishes the
empirical issue of causal contribution, in clause (a), from the nor-
mative issue of the extent of legal responsibility for negligently
caused harm, in clause (b). A number of courts seem to think that it
does. 12 So did William Prosser, who was the Reporter for the rele-
vant portions of the Second Restatement. While he acknowledged
that the "substantial factor" formulation was initially adopted as a
test of both cause-in-fact and the appropriate extent of legal re-
sponsibility for tortiously caused consequences, Prosser asserted in
the first edition of his influential treatise that the "substantial fac-
tor" formulation could and should be used solely as a means of
posing the empirical issue of causal contribution'13 In the subse-
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 (1965). Slightly different wording appeared in the First
Restatement:
The words "legal cause" are used .. . to denote the fact that the manner in
which the actor's tortious conduct has resulted in [a legally recognized injury]
is such that the law regards it just to hold the actor responsible for such harm.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 9 (1934). However, in both restatements, comment b of section 9 ech-
oes the language in section 431(b):
[To be a legal cause] the act or omission must be a substantial factor in bring-
ing about the harm, and there must be no principle or rule of law which re-
stricts the actor's liability because of the manner in which the act -or omission
operates to bring about [the harm].
E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 cmt. b (1965). Compare id., with id. § 431(b).
12. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991). The majority approved an in-
struction, supposedly limited to the issue of cause-in-fact, which included the phrases "legal
cause" and "substantial factor" and made those phrases and the word "cause" the sole question-
begging "tests" of cause-in-fact: "A legal cause of [injury] ... is a cause which is a substantial
factor in bringing about the [injury]." Id. at 873 n.2; see id. at 879. The majority claimed (erro-
neously) that the "substantial factor" formulation had been "comparatively free of criticism and
has even received praise," yet thereafter noted some significant criticisms of the formulation. Id.
at 878-79. Even the dissenting judge, despite noting additional criticisms of the "substantial
factor" formulation, did not seem to find fault with the approved instruction as an instruction on
cause-in-fact, but rather argued that the rejection of the former "proximate cause" instruction
left California courts with no adequate approved general instruction on the extent-of-
responsibility issue. See id. at 883-84 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Stapleton cites Mitchell as a
case in which the "substantial factor" formulation was used "as a device to evade the normative
issue presented by over-determined events." Stapleton, supra note 1, at 979 n.91. However,
there was no over-determination in Mitchell. The defendants' negligent acts and omissions all
were but-for causes of the child's drowning. The court turned to the "legal cause" instruction
primarily because the alternative instruction had the misleading phrase "proximate cause," see
supra note 10, but also noted that the defense attorney had twisted the "but for" language in the
proximate-cause instruction into an argument that the plaintiff could not recover if his inability
to swim was a but-for cause of his drowning, see Mitchell, 819 P.2d at 880. Nevertheless, the
court assumed a proper instruction could/would include "but for" language. Id. at 879 n.10.
13. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAv OF TORTS 318-19, 321, 323-24 (1st ed.
1941). David Robertson, despite noting various misuses of the substantial-factor formulation, is
a rare recent supporter of Prosser's assertion. He finds the formulation to be appropriate only
when the but-for test fails because there were multiple forces, each of which would have been
independently sufficient. He describes the Restatements specification of such situations in sec-
tion 432(2) as a "suitably tight definition," and he states that a recent decision "captures the
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quent editions of his treatise, Prosser asserted that "the 1948 revi-
sion of the [First] Restatement has limited its application very defi-
nitely to the fact of causation alone."14
The 1948 revision, for which Laurence Eldredge was the Re-
porter, modified section 433,15 which lists a number of considera-
tions as important in determining whether a person's conduct was a
substantial factor in producing the plaintiffs injury. Before the re-
vision, section 433 listed the following considerations:
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and the
extent of the effect which they have in producing it;
(b) whether after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negli-
gent conduct it appears highly extraordinary that it should have brought
about the harm;
(c) whether the actor's conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in
continuous and active operation up to the time of the harm, or has created a
situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not
responsible;
(d) lapse of time.Z6
The 1948 revision deleted clause (b) and renumbered the remaining
items.'7 The Second Restatement, for which Prosser was the Re-
porter, preserved the 1948 amendments. 18 Prosser also reproduced,
thought perfectly." See David NV. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L
REV. 1765, 1777-78 (1997). For discussion of the significant problems with section 432(2) of the
Restatement, see infra text accompanying notes 95-107. For discussion of the significant prob-
lems with the "captured thought" in the recent decision, see infra note 102. Robertson does not
explain why the unhelpful and misleading phrase, "substantial factor," should be used, rather
than a direct reference to the independently-sufficient-condition test.
14. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 256 (2d ed. 1955); \VILLAIIA L
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 286-87 (3d ed. 1964); WILLIAM L PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 248 (4th ed. 1971). Each edition cited "Restatement of Torts,
1948 Supp., § 433." The editors of the posthumous edition of Prosser's treatise retained Presser's
assertion, but contradicted it with an explicit acknowledgment that "[t]he 'substantial factor'
formulation is one concerning legal significance rather than factual quantum." See W. PACE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAv OF TORTS 267, 278 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON]; id. 268-69 (suggesting an alternative to the substantial-factor formulation).
But see Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1780-81 (criticizing the proposed alternative).
15. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, 1948 SUPPLEMErNT, Torts § 433 at 733 (1949).
16. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 433 (1934).
17. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, 1948 SUPPLEMENT, Torts § 433 at 733 (1949). The lan-
guage in clause (b), with the words "to the court" inserted after the word "appears," was added to
section 435 as section 435(2). The reporter explained. "Clause (b) and the comments to it deleted
from this section are transferred to § 435. This is done to eliminate the inconsistencies in origi-
nal §§ 431, 433 and 442 and the confusion they have caused and to clarify the separate problems
involved." Id. at 734 M'Reason for Changes").
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433 & 435(2) (1965).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:3:1071
in a 1966 Appendix volume to the Second Restatement, 19 a note in
the 1948 Supplement that explained the rationale for the deletion
of clause (b):
[T]he "substantial factor" element [in § 431(1)] deals with causation in fact while
the other element [in § 431(2)] deals with a legal policy relieving the actor of li-
ability for harm he has, as a matter of fact, caused. The conclusion that it appears
highly extraordinary that the conduct should have brought about the harm has
nothing to do with the question whether it did actually "cause" the harm. The
question of actual causation involves an application of the laws of physics to the
data to determine whether there is an unbroken chain of causes and effects,
starting with the negligent conduct and ending with the harm complained of. Once
that question is answered "yes," the only remaining problem of actual causation is
the determination of whether the negligent conduct played a "substantial" part in
bringing about the harm. It seems obvious that the negligence may have been a
"substantial factor" in a particular case regardless of how "highly extraordinary"
the chain of events appears in retrospect. It is completely faulty analysis, in view
of § 431, to list the "extraordinary" element as a part of the "substantial factor"
aspect of legal cause particularly in view of § 442[(b)] which lists it as a part of the
quite separate superseding cause problem. It is confusing the question of policy
with the question of fact .... 20
This transitional Reporter's note, which does not appear in
any permanent section or comment in the Restatement, is clearly
insufficient notice that "the Restatement has limited its application
[of the 'substantial factor' formulation] very definitely to the fact of
causation alone."21 Moreover, as the note itself makes clear, the
phrase "substantial factor" literally requires not only that a condi-
tion be a "factor" (without providing any guidance on what consti-
tutes a "factor") but also that it be "substantial"-a qualifier that
deliberately and inevitably introduces non-causal normative or
policy issues.
Jeremiah Smith first proposed the "substantial factor" for-
mulation, as a guide for resolving the extent-of-responsibility issue
rather than the causal-contribution issue. He was content with the
usual necessary-condition ("but for") test as a test of cause-in-fact,
with an exception for simultaneous, independently sufficient tor-
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, APPENDIX § 433 Reporter's Notes (1966). Stapleton
states that, apart from this note, the Restatement contains no reference to "factual cause,"
"cause-in-fact," or "actual cause" in its chapter on legal cause. Stapleton, supra note 1, at 972.73.
But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. b (1965) (declaring that "the question,
whether the defendanes negligence has a substantial as distinguished from a merely negligible
effect in bringing about the plaintiffs harm . . .becomes important" only when the evidence
permits an affirmative answer to the prior question of"whether the actor's negligence was in fact
the cause of the other's harm-that is, whether it had any effect in producing it") (emphasis
added).
20. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, 1948 SUPPLEMENT, Torts § 433 at 733-34 (1949) ("Reason for
Changes").
21. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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tious conditions. 22 He wanted to devise a practical alternative to the
"probability" or "foreseeability" tests for determining the extent of
responsibility for tortiously caused harm, since he believed that
those tests were unsound and inconsistent with the results in many
cases. 23 He proposed the following formulation: "Defendant's tort
must have been a substantial factor in producing the damage com-
plained of."24 The accompanying explanation and alternative for-
mulations clearly stated that the defendant's tortious conduct could
not be a substantial factor unless it not only satisfied the but-for
test (with an exception for simultaneous, independently sufficient
conditions), but also was an appreciable and continuously effective
or efficient factor in producing the harm, up to the time of occur-
rence of the harm.25 Thus, the substantial-factor formulation was
meant to be used as the test of legal (proximate) cause, but also
subsumed the but-for test (and its exception) for cause-in-fact.
Smith's approach was adopted in the First Restatement and
retained in the Second Restatement, despite efforts by Prosser,
Leon Green, and others to confine the term "substantial factor" to
the actual-cause issue.26 As Stapleton notes, 27 the Restatement con-
tinues to list several non-causal considerations as important in de-
termining whether a person's conduct was a substantial factor in
producing the harm, 28 and it explicitly states:
The word "substantial" [in the phrase "substantial factor"] is used to denote the
fact that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to
lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense,
in which there always lurks the idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-called
"philosophic sense," which includes every one of the great number of events with-
out which any happening would not have occurred.2
22. Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103, 103-09 & n.20
(1911) [hereinafter Smith, Legal Cause part 1]; Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort,
25 HARV. L. REV. 223, 227 (1912) [hereinafter Smith, Legal Cause part 2]; Jeremiah Smith, Legal
Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 303, 312, 314 n.36, 316-17 n.41 (1912) [hereinafter
Smith, Legal Cause part 3].
23. Smith, Legal Cause part 1, supra note 22, at 105, 115-28; Smith, Legal Cause part 2, su-
pra note 22, at 223-52; Smith, Legal Cause part 3, supra note 22, at 308-09.
24. Smith, Legal Cause part 3, supra note 22, at 309.
25. Id. at 310-12, 314 n.36.
26. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 432-33 (1934); LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE
CAUSE 137, 140, 180-85 (1927); LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 190-95 (1930); Leon Green, The
Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 557-59 (1962); Wright, Causa-
tion, supra note 3, at 1781-84 (from which the sentence in the text and the prior paragraph were
taken); supra text accompanying notes 11-20; infra text accompanying note 95.
27. Stapleton, supra note 1, at 975-76.
28. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1965). David Fischer purports to find
the substantial-factor formulation useful for "resolving difficult cause-in-fact problems in [the
2001] 1079
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As a test for determining either causal contribution or the
extent of legal responsibility for tortiously caused injury, the sub-
stantial-factor formulation is completely useless. Hopefully, Dan
Dobbs' telling description of the test will become its epitaph: "The
substantial factor test is not so much a test as an incantation. It
points neither to any reasoning nor to any facts that will assist
courts or lawyers in resolving the question of causation."30
3. Stapleton's Proposed Non-Causal Terminology
I strongly support Stapleton's insistence on the critical im-
portance of (1) clearly distinguishing for separate analysis the em-
pirical issue of causal contribution and the normative issue of the
extent of legal responsibility for tortiously caused consequences;
and (2) using phrases other than "legal cause," "proximate cause,"
"substantial factor," or perhaps even "actual cause" or "cause-in-
fact" to refer to these two distinct issues.3' I have emphasized these
same points in my earlier articles.3 2 However, I disagree with
Stapleton's proposed terminology. She uses the phrases "historical
involvement" or "played a role in the history of the outcome [or
transition]" to refer to the empirical issue of causal contribution.
She employs the phrase "scope of liability for consequences" to refer
to the issue of the extent of legal responsibility for tortiously caused
consequences. 33 I believe that these phrases are also potentially
over-determined multiple] omission cases" precisely because it merges the empirical issue of
causal contribution and the normative issue of legal responsibility. David A. Fischer, Causation
in Fact in Omission Cases, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1335, 1348; see infra text accompanying notes
191-197. However, the substantial-factor formulation does not "resolve" anything, but rather
merely restates, confuses, and begs both the empirical issue of causal contribution and the nor-
mative issue of legal responsibility.
30. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 416 (2000).
31. See Stapleton, supra note 1, at 958-59, 966-81, 1004-09. Although Stapleton continues to
use the phrase "cause-in-fact," see id. at 945, 967, 978, 1004-05, she notes its possible misinter-
pretation and places primary emphasis on the phrases "historical involvement" or "historical
role" as replacements for, or at least elaborations of, the phrase "cause-in-fact." See id. at 945,
958-62, 965-69, 1007-09; infra text accompanying notes 33-35.
32. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1737-58, 1764 n.121, 1781-83, 1791-92; Wright,
Bramble Bush, supra note 3, at 1004-18. There is also the need to distinguish the empirical
issue of causal contribution from the normative issues of specifying the required tortious conduct
and the required legal injury for a particular tort cause of action. Although these normative
issues definitely shape the framing of the causal-contribution inquiry, they are distinct from and
prior to the causal-contribution inquiry, which itself is an entirely empirical inquiry. See Wright,
Causation, supra note 3, at 1741-59; Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 3, at 1004, 1011-18;
Robertson, supra note 13, at 1769-71. In the end, Stapleton herself fails to distinguish these
normative issues from the causal-contribution issue. See infra text accompanying notes 157-180.
33. E.g., Stapleton, supra note 1, at 845, 951, 956-67, 974, 980.
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misleading, especially the "historical involvement" and "played a
role in the history" phrases.
As others have pointed out,34 assessments of historical in-
volvement or historical role usually turn on non-empirical assess-
ments of historical significance. Inquiries about historical involve-
ment or historical role focus on those causally relevant factors that
seem most significant in explaining the event that transpired, and
they depend on the particular context and purpose of the historical
inquiry and the viewpoint of the inquirer. Such inquiries thus in-
volve normative or policy judgments in addition to the purely em-
pirical issue of causal contribution. Moreover, accounts of "histori-
cal involvement" or being "part of the history" may well encompass
historical details that bear no causal relevance to the outcome in
question. Although, as was noted above,35 causal language itself is
often used to convey non-empirical assessments of significance in
addition to the empirical assessment of causal contribution, it al-
most always includes the empirical assessment of causal contribu-
tion. Thus, I think it is a mistake, when focusing on the empirical
issue of causal contribution, to entirely abandon causal language as
Stapleton proposes. Instead, the causal language chosen must, to
the maximum extent possible, exclude consideration of significance.
Phrases such as "the cause" or even "a cause" should not be used. I
prefer phrases such as "empirical causal contribution," "causal con-
tribution," or even merely "contribution"-as in, "Did it contribute,
in even the slightest way, to the result?"
I agree with Stapleton that a (primarily) non-causal, norma-
tive phrase such as the one she suggests, "scope of liability for the
consequences of tortious conduct,"36 should be used to clearly dis-
tinguish the normative issue of the appropriate extent of legal re-
sponsibility for tortiously caused injury from the empirical issue of
whether the defendant's tortious conduct contributed to the plain-
tiffs injury. However, the phrase can and should be sharpened a bit
more. First, the word "liability" should be changed to "responsibil-
ity," since the issue arises not only in the prima facie case against
the defendant, but also in the defense of plaintiffs contributory
negligence. A plaintiff cannot be held liable for her own injury, but
if she was contributorily negligent she can be deemed responsible
34. See, e.g., HIL.A. HART & TONY HONOR9, CAUSATION IN THE LAWV 9-13, 35-37, 60, 63 (2d
ed. 1985); W.IL Dray, Causal Judgment in Attributite and Explanatory Contexts, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 13, passin; M~fichael Scriven, The Structure of Science, 17
REV. METAPHYSICS 403, 407-10 (1964).
35. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
36. E.g., Stapleton, supra note 1, at 945, 951, 980, 984.
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(along with others) for its occurrence, and her responsibility can
and should be compared with the defendant's responsibility in order
to determine the defendant's ultimate liability. Second, the word
"scope" should be changed to "extent." The phrases "scope of liabil-
ity" or "scope of responsibility" can easily be interpreted as encom-
passing not only the "Adam and Eve" issue of the extent of legal
responsibility for tortiously caused injury, but also the prior issue of
the existence of an obligation to conduct oneself in a certain way in
light of the foreseeable risks. I believe the phrase "extent of legal
responsibility for tortiously caused injury" better conveys the na-
ture of the issue involved.
B. Focusing the Causal-Contribution Inquiry on the Tortious Aspect
of the Defendant's Conduct
Although it is rarely noticed, Restatement section 431(a)
does not require (as it should) that the defendant's negligence (e.g.,
excess speed) contributed to the plaintiffs injury, but rather only
that the defendant's conduct (e.g., driving a car) was a "substantial
factor" in producing the harm. 37 Section 431 thus seems to adopt
the analytic approach favored most prominently by Robert Keeton
and Leon Green, by making the causal-contribution inquiry almost
trivial and putting all the weight on a harm-matches-the-risk
analysis under clause (b).
38
Keeton and Green's overall-conduct approach is correctly
avoided in negligence actions by the subsequent phrasing of section
432.39 However, section 519 of the Second Restatement explicitly
adopted the overall-conduct approach in the context of strict liabil-
ity actions for "abnormally dangerous" activities, after John Wade
had succeeded Prosser as the Reporter. In the First Restatement,
section 519 correctly required the plaintiff to prove that the ultra-
hazardous aspect of the defendant's activity caused her harm:
[O]ne who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person,
land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpre-
ventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that which
makes the activity ultrahazardous .... 40
37. See supra text accompanying note 11.
38. See ROBERT KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS viii-ix, 10-16 (1963); Green,
supra note 26. Keeton's and Green's analyses are criticized in Wright, Causation, supra note 3,
at 1761-66.
39. See infra text accompanying note 95.
40. RESTATEMENT OFTORTS § 519 (1938) (emphasis added).
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However, in the Second Restatement, for which Keeton and other
prominent supporters of the harm-matches-the-risk rule were ad-
visers, 41 section 519 was modified to conform to Keeton's overall-
condudt approach:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for
harm to the person, land, or chattels of another resulting from the activity ...
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
42
As I have demonstrated in a prior article, the overall-conduct
approach can lead to absurd results, and the courts have clearly
rejected it.43 The courts require instead that the plaintiff prove that
the tortious aspect of the defendant's conduct contributed to the
plaintiffs injury.4 The Third Restatement should correct the ear-
41. The following advisers, at least, were prominent proponents of the "harm within the
risk" rule: Laurence H. Eldredge, Fleming James, Jr., Robert E. Keeton, W. Page Keeton, Vex S.
Malone, and Warren A- Seavey. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 504-707A, atv (1977);
Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1759-60 & n.105, 1771 nn.146-49.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (emphasis added). The Second Re-
statement omitted the prior language limiting liability to those whom the actor "should recognize
as likely to be harmed" by the miscarriage of the activity. However, it seems to have been as-
sumed that this limitation was encompassed by section 519(2). See id. § 519(2) cmt. e (discussing
risks and harms to those "in the vicinity"). The Reporter's Note to section 519 of the Second
Restatement merely noted, "This section has been changed by the substitution of 'abnormally
dangerous' for 'ultrahazardous,' and by the addition of Subsection (2)." RESrATEIMENT (SECON1D)
OF TORTS, APPENDIX § 519, Reporter's Note (1981).
43. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1759-74; accord, Robertson, supra note 13, at
1770 & n.19 (stating that the overall-conduct approach "is a decidedly eccentric view of cause in
fact, shared by only a few analysts and having no appreciable judicial influence"). David Fischer
cites a couple of idiosyncratic product-liability failure-to-warn cases as having adopted the over-
all-conduct approach. See Fischer, supra note 29, at 1355 & n.83 (citing Frankel v. Lull Engg
Co., 334 F. Supp. 913, 925-26 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Muncy v. Magnolia Chem. Co., 437 S.W.2d 15, 19
(Tex. Civ. App. 1968)).
44. In their latest attempt to bolster the controversial "feasible alternative design" require-
ment in the Restatement Third of Torts on Products Liability, James Henderson and Aaron
Twerski really mix things up. First, they claim that the only actual-causation requirement is
that the defendants overall conduct, "quite apart from its wrongful nature," was either a neces-
sary condition or an independently sufficient condition for the occurrence of the harm. James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intuition and Technology in Product Design Litigation: An
Essay on Proximate Causation, 88 GEO. L.J. 659, 663-64 & n.23 (2000) (citing Smith v. Rapid
Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Mass. 1945)). The Smith case does not support the overall-
conduct approach. The bus at issue allegedly negligently forced the plaintiff to turn into a
parked car. The issue in the case was whether the plaintiff could prevail, in the absence of any
concrete evidence regarding who owned the bus, based merely on an abstract statistical prob-
ability that it was the defendant's bus. The court correctly concluded that such evidence is insuf-
ficient to establish actual causation. See Smith, 58 N.E.2d at 754-55; Wright, Bramble Bush,
supra note 3, at 1049-67. Similarly, contrary to what Henderson and Twerski state, see
Henderson & Twerski, supra, at 665 & nn.32 & 33, the difficult causation issues in many of the
toxic tort cases (the "generic causation" issue of whether the substance is even capable of caus-
ing the harm at issue, and the "specific causation" issue of whether, assuming such general
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lier Restatements' erroneous unfocusing of the causal-contribution
inquiry, by clearly stating that the causal-contribution inquiry
must be narrowly focused on the tortious aspect of the defendant's
conduct.
45
causal capacity, it can be proven that exposure -to the substance actually contributed to the
plaintiffs injury) have nothing to do with the supposed overall-conduct approach to actual causa-
tion. In each of those cases, it is assumed or alleged that the plaintiffs exposure to the substance
was caused by the tortious aspect of the defendant's conduct; the contested causal issue is
whether such exposure is capable of causing, and in the particular case actually contributed to,
the plaintiffs injury.
Second, although Henderson and Twerski recognize and indeed insist upon the tortious-
aspect causation requirement, they incorrectly treat it as an issue of proximate causation rather
than actual causation, and they incorrectly require, contrary to the courts and the Restatement,
that the tortious aspect must have been a necessary (but-for) condition, with no exception for
independently sufficient or otherwise contributing conditions. See id. at 664; infra text accom-
panying notes 95-107. They also assert that a third essential "causation" requirement is a harm-
matches-the-risk rule. This supposed rule is not followed by most courts. Instead, the courts
follow, sometimes explicitly but more often implicitly, a harm-results-from-the-risk rule, which is
the rule that is explicitly stated in the case which they cite. See Henderson & Twerski, supra, at
664 (quoting Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 610 (1st Cir. 1955), as stating that "the effort of
the courts has been, in the development of this doctrine of proximate causation, to confine the
liability of a negligent actor to those harmful consequences which result from the operation of the
risk . . . the foreseeability of which rendered the defendant's conduct negligent") (emphasis
added).
Third, Henderson and Twerski incorrectly identify or merge the risk-reduction requirement
for a feasible alternative design-the requirement that the alleged alternative design must ro.
duce the ex ante risks of injury-with the ex post causal-contribution issue of whether the negli-
gent failure to adopt such a safer alternative design contributed to the injury. They would re-
quire, contrary to the case law in over-determined-causation cases such as the multiple-fires
cases, multiple-sources-of-pollution cases, and multiple-exposures-to-asbestos cases, that the
failure to adopt the (safer) alternative design must have been a necessary (but-for) cause of the
injury. See Henderson & Twerski, supra, at 661, 666-67. They state that the supposed identity
of the ex ante risk-reduction requirement and the but-for test of ex post causal contribution is an
"insight" which they and other academics have previously failed to see, an "insight" which alleg-
edly strengthens the argument for their controversial feasible-alternative-design requirement.
See id. at 661. To the contrary, it is a serious conceptual confusion which they, as reporters,
previously inserted in a draft of the Restatement of Products Liability, but which was removed
(with their acquiescence) at the 1996 annual meeting of the American Law Institute. See
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 73RD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 136-38 (1996).
An attempt to eliminate this conceptual confusion failed the prior year, when the reporters,
especially Twerski, defended the relevant language as being "an important teaching tool," even
though it was pointed out that the language confused the ex ante risk-reduction requirement for
a defective design with the inadequate but-for test of ex post causal contribution to the injury.
See PROCEEDINGS OF THE 72ND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 226-28
(1995).
45. Accord Stapleton, supra note 1, at 945, 964-65 & n.58, 978 n.90. However, Stapleton
does not state this principle precisely enough. The causal-contribution inquiry must be focused
on the tortious aspect of the defendant's tortious conduct (or the negligent aspect of the plaintiffs
negligent conduct) rather than on the person's tortious (or negligent) conduct described merely as
an act or omission. The description of the tortious (or negligent) conduct must include those
aspects of the conduct which made it tortious (or negligent)-e.g., leaving a loaded gun lying
around, sitting on an unstable wall, or standing on the unrailed portion of a platform-and those
existing conditions, as well as the act or omission per se, must have causally contributed to the
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C. Lack of Generality
Although the "legal caus6" element is a required element of
every tort (as well as every contributory negligence defense), there
is no section in the Restatement that states this general require-
ment; instead, it appears only in a few comments. 46 The Restate-
ment's chapter on legal cause, chapter 16, deals solely with the tort
of negligence, except for a few scattered, vague sections and com-
ments. 47 I agree with Stapleton that the Third Restatement should
(1) clearly state in relevant generally applicable sections that the
empirical and normative issues that are currently confusingly en-
compassed by the "legal cause" requirement arise in every tort ac-
tion; and (2) provide more guidance on whether the same or differ-
ent rules or principles govern the resolution of these issues in the
different types of tort actions.48
Paradoxically, the lack of general principles is a serious
problem in the so-called General Principles project and in the Third
Restatement as a (jumbled) "whole." The "General Principles" proj-
ect is currently limited to physical injuries, and it excludes all no-
duty (e.g., nonfeasance) or limited duty (e.g., risks to entrants on
one's land) situations.49 Nonetheless, the title, "General Principles,"
plaintiffs injury. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1766-74; Tony Honor, Necessary and
Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LANW 363, 368
(David G. Owen ed., 1995). For suggested language for stating this requirement, see infra text
accompanying note 129.
Stapleton claims that both the tortious-conduct inquiry and the subsequent causal-
contribution inquiry are rendered highly subjective and manipulable by the need to select the
"comparator class" for her "made a difference" analysis of individual responsibility. Stapleton,
supra note 1, at 964 n.58; Stapleton, Perspectives, supra note 2, at 66-70. Neither process is
nearly as open-ended and subjective as she claims. The standard for assessing tortious conduct
is generally fixed as the "ordinary prudent person" with normal physical and mental abilities
and skills, but also includes any above-normal knowledge, abilities, or skills that the defendant
actually possesses or should possess given the occupation or activity in which he or she is en-
gaged. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 283, 289, 299 & cmts. c & & 299A (1965). Simi-
larly, the causal-contribution analysis, properly done, does not involve mental explorations of
hypothetical or imaginary "alternative universes," see Stapleton, supra note 1, at 961 n.46, 963,
but rather the matching of existing conditions against the required elements of causal generali-
zations that are believed to apply in our world. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1803-13;
Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 3, at 1039-42; cf. Robertson, supra note 13, at 1770-71.
46. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 9 cmt. a, 430 cmt. e (1965).
47. Id. § 430 cmt. e (intentional torts and strict liability); id. § 435A & cmt. a (intentional
torts); id. § 435B & cmt. a (intentional torts); id. § 501 & cmt. a (recklessness); cf. RESTATEIHNr
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. 1 (1979) (the "innominate" or "prima facie" inten-
tional tort); id. § 917 (extent of liability for damages).
48. See Stapleton, supra note 1, at 951 n.26, 971-72.
49. See RESTATMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES at xxi (Discussion Draft Apr.
5, 1999) [hereinafter Discussion Draft]; cf. id. § 14 scope note.
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implies general rather than limited applicability, and the sections
and comments are usually worded in general terms with no indica-
tion of limited applicability, yet are not valid if applied generally.
Citations to supporting cases for some sections, for example, section
4 and its comment d on the supposed risk-utility definition of negli-
gence, consist almost entirely of citations to cases involving risks to
entrants on land and other situations supposedly excluded from the
scope of the draft. 50 The failure to express clearly and adhere to
scope limits throughout the draft can only lead to serious confusion
by those attempting to use the Restatement. More significantly,
although it seems too late to do much about this problem, the
breaking up of the Third Restatement into numerous limited and
mutually incoherent projects seems almost guaranteed to make it
even more confusing, contradictory, and misleading than the first
two restatements, which themselves were hardly models of clear
and orderly exposition.
III. DUTY
Stapleton expresses grave concern over what she sees as a
failure of the existing Restatement, and of United States tort schol-
ars and lawyers in general, to pay sufficient attention to the need to
place explicit limits and controls on the duty of care in negligence
law. She claims that the Second Restatement, "reflect[ing] the
dominant academic fashions of the time," was motivated by a "skep-
ticism about the role of the duty concept and a preference for jury
judgment."51 Therefore, she states, it "embrace[d] a general duty
owed 'to the whole world' [which] left most issues to be dealt with
under the rubric of the other recognized elements of the tort, in-
cluding 'legal cause,' "52 which she assumes is generally treated as
an issue of fact for the jury.53 One senses a strong undercurrent of
50. See id. § 4 cmt. c, Reporter's Note.
51. Stapleton, supra note 1, at 945 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 944.
52. Id. at (footnotes omitted).
53. See id. at 955. However, legal-cause issues as well as duty issues are often decided by
judges in the United States. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328B(b) & (e) (1965). It is
often assumed that Judge Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf, which adopted the narrow relational
approach to duty, was motivated by a desire to shift power from juries to judges by making the
issue an issue of law for the judge. See, e.g., Stapleton, supra note 1, at 954 n.33. However,
Cardozo treated the duty issue in Palsgraf as an issue of fact to be left to the jury if reasonable
minds could differ, as with any other issue of fact. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99,
101 (N.Y. 1928). According to Cardozo, "[the range of reasonable apprehension is at times a
question for the court, and at times, if varying inferences are possible, a question for the jury.
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belief that tort liability in the United States has gone awry in the
direction of unbounded liability as a result of contingency fees,5" the
(optional) use of civil juries,5 5 and "[t]he emergence of a large, na-
tion-wide, entrepeneurial and intellectually inventive plaintiffs'
bar" which has "hastened the exposure of the intrinsically voracious
nature of the negligence principle, putting pressure on court dock-
Here, by concession, there was nothing in the situation to suggest to the most cautious mind that
the parcel wrapped in newspaper would spread wreckage through the station." Id.
54. See Stapleton, supra note 1, at 946.
55. See id. at 946, 954-55; cf. id. at 956 ('There is no convincing evidence that American ju-
ries in general are running wild, or that they are impervious to reasoned argument"). Actually.
there is quite strong evidence to the contrary, from the past to the present. See, e.g., Harry Kal-
ven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964) (finding that in 79% of cases
judges and juries agreed on liability, in 1096 of cases judges would have found liability where
juries did not, in 11% of cases juries found liability where the judges would not have; and that
judges would have found liability in 5456 of total cases, whereas the juries actually held the de-
fendants liable in 55% of total cases); It Perry Sentel, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence. The
View from the Bench, 26 GA. L. REV. 85 (1991) (similar results). Several empirical studies have
reported higher plaintiff success rates with judges than juries. See, e.g., CAROL J. DEFRANCES &
MARIKA F.X_ LITRAS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, CIVL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE
COUNTIES, 1996, at 6 (1999) (NCJ-173426) (finding that plaintiffs won 48% of state tort trials
overall: 48% of jury trials and 57,Q of bench trials), available at
http://www.ojp.usdo.govbjs/pub/pdf/ctvlc96.pdt Kevin M.t Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Trial by Jury or Judge" Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L REV. 1124 (1992) (product
liability cases); Neil Vidmar, The Unfair Criticism of Medical falpractice Juries, 76 JUDICATURE
118 (1992) (medical malpractice cases); see also VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE
JURY (1986); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspec-
tive, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 849 (1998).
Studies have uniformly found that, while juries find in favor of plaintiffL in around 50% of all
tort cases (compared to around 600% of contract cases), they are much more likely to find in favor
of defendants in the two most controversial and publicized areas of tort liability: medical mal-
practice and product liability. See, e.g., DEFRANCES & LITRAS, supra, at 6 (finding that plaintiffs
won 48% of all tort jury verdicts in 1996, but only 23%,S in medical malpractice cases and 31% in
product liability cases, except for asbestos-related claims, of which plaintiffs won 55%); CAROL J.
DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES,
at 4 (1995) (NCJ-154346) (finding that plaintiffs won half of total jury tort verdicts in 1992, but
only 30% in medical malpractice cases and 400 in product liability cases), available at
httpJ/vww.ojp.usdo.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cjcavilc.pdf, CAROL J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA F.X. LITRAS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL TORT TRIALS AND VERDICTS, 1996-97, at 5 (1999) (NCJ-172855)
(finding that plaintiffs won 45% of all trials, 7503 of which were decided by juries: 34% in medical
malpractice cases and 29% in product liability cases), available at
http://www.ojp.usdo.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fttv97.pdf, ANDREW H. PRESS & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL TORT TRIALS AND VERDICTS, 1994-95, at 4 (1997) (NCJ-165810)
(finding that plaintiffs won 43% of all trials, 72% of which were decided by juries: 3235 in medical
malpractice cases and 27% in product liability cases), available at
http:/wv.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fttv95.pdf; see also John A. Goerdt et al., Special Issue.:
Litigation Dimensions - Torts and Contracts in Large Urban Courts, 19(1) STATE Cr. J. 1, 24, 32
(1995). Doctors reportedly are winning a higher and higher percentage of verdicts, approaching
90% in some of the largest urban jurisdictions. See ERIK MOLLER, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY
VERDICTS SINCE 1985, at 15-19 (RAND, Document No. MR.694.ICJ, 1996).
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ets," 56 and "constrain[ed] American courts' adoption of the no-duty
strategy"5 7 as a means of controlling this voraciousness.
Believing that the prior restatements contain "dogmas such
as the general duty owed to the whole world and the implicit as-
sumption that a defendant will be liable for a consequence of tor-
tious conduct unless, exceptionally, a rule restricting liability oper-
ates,"58 Stapleton argues that the Third Restatement should follow
the lead of foreign common law jurisdictions by resisting the "emo-
tional allure" of this general duty for "non-traditional" types of
cases. 59 She supports the general-duty principle for "traditional"
cases involving physical injuries that result from a person's positive
acts-a principle which she says is recognized outside the United
States and which she describes as "the continent of obligation in the
traditional running down-type case."60 However, she asserts that
the Restatement and tort scholars in the United States have failed
to recognize, as foreign courts have, the need for a "vast ocean of
freedom from liability . . . dotted with much smaller carefully
charted islands of non-traditional [limited relational] duties."6' 1 She
urges that the restricted-duty approach be applied to "[m]odern
56. See Stapleton, supra note 1, at 946 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. at 955.
58. Id. at 944.
59. See id. at 946-47. Stapleton claims that "[a] common law judgment that recognizes a
new entitlement rule, such as MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., . . . seeks to justify a shift in dis-
tribution and is therefore appropriately assessed in terms of theories of distributive justice," and
she views corrective justice as simply involving applications of the distributively created rule or
correcting departures from it. See id. at 947 n.12. Her understanding is not consistent with that
of the British courts, as represented by her quotation from Lord Steyn, who declared that "tort
law is a mosaic in which the principles of corrective justice and distributive justice are inter.
woven .... in situations of uncertainty and difficulty a choice sometimes has to be made between
the two approaches." Id. (quoting McFarlane v. Tayside Health Bd., [1999] 4 All E.R. 961, 977-
78 (Lord Steyn)). For discussions of the distinct and independent natures of distributive justice
and interactive (corrective) justice, which are the positive and negative aspects of the founda-
tional norm of equal external freedom, see Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Justice, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1859, 1883-92 (2000); Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice, and Tort Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 159, 166-81 (David G. Owen ed. 1995); Richard W.
Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 625, 691-710 (1992). For a few of the
considerations that United States courts take into account when deciding whether to create,
expand, or limit some duty, see infra note 73.
60. Stapleton, supra note 1, at 948 ; see id. at 946, 950 n.24; Stapleton, Perspectives, supra
note 2, at 79 & nn.46 & 47. Although Stapleton limits the general duty to negligence involving
"(positive) acts," see Stapleton, supra note 1, at 946, 948 n.24, the general duty in negligence law
applies to omissions (e.g., failures to brake or to watch out for other traffic) as well as acts. The
distinction that Stapleton seems to have in mind, or should have in mind, is the distinction be-
tween misfeasance (creating or enhancing a risk to another through one's own conduct, whether
by an act or an omission) and nonfeasance (failing to warn or guard another against a risk cre-
ated by a third person or a condition for which one is not responsible).
61. Stapleton, supra note 1, at 948.
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non-traditional claims . . . ranging] from ones for pure nervous
shock or pure economic loss to a diverse range of physical injury
claims of affirmative duties (omission cases such as ... wrongful
failure to control a third party) that have proved particularly trou-
blesome, especially when brought against deep-pocketed public
authorities.
'62
When one takes into account the legal environment in which
Stapleton has worked-the United Kingdom and the British Com-
monwealth countries-one can appreciate her preoccupation with
the problems posed by the "vast ocean" of "non-traditional" claims
of negligence liability for pure economic loss, pure emotional dis-
tress, and the failure (particularly of "deep pocket public authori-
ties") to control or guard against the negligence of third parties. In
Anns v. Merton London Borough,6 3 the British House of Lords an-
nounced a broad general duty that (to continue Stapleton's meta-
phor) British courts took up to sail boldly, like British explorers of
old, into previously uncharted waters staking out new colonies of
negligence liability. British academics, practicing lawyers, and
courts became enmeshed in attempts to delineate and manage these
new colonies. Being unable to do so, they eventually undertook a
prudent retreat.
64
Like many others, Stapleton assumes that the situation
must be much worse in the United States:
Since the 1964 adoption and 1965 publication of the relevant sections on legal
cause in the Restatement (Second), American courts have faced even greater pres-
sures associated with non-traditional claims than courts in other jurisdictions.
Relative to the rest of the common law world, the intellectual inventiveness of
many American plaintiffs' lawyers, coupled with the willingness to back it with
their own financing, is remarkable. Since the negligence principle invites inven-
tion, non-traditional claims have burgeoned in the United States, especially claims
in the form of complaints of failure to control a third party. Many American courts
now share the view that liability for harm resulting from carelessness in non-
traditional cases can and should, at most, be limited to what I have elsewhere
called "pockets" or "islands" of duty: that the negligence principle requires clear
and tight control. But in the United States the control of liability in non-
traditional negligence claims by means of no-duty rules is significantly constrained
[by the plaintiffs' bar].6 5
62. Id. at 946.
63. Anns v. Merton London Borough, [1978] A.C. 728 (ELL.).
64. See R.F.V. HEUSTON & R.A. BUCKLEY, SALMOND & HEUSTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 204-
07 (20th ed. 1992); W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ ON TORT 82-90 (14th ed. 1994);
Stapleton, supra note 1, at 946-49.
65. Stapleton, supra note 1, at 953. Although Stapleton seems to imply otherwise, the sec-
tions on duty and legal cause in the Second Restatement that were approved in 1964 are essen-
tially the same as those adopted in 1934 in the First Restatement. See supra text accompanying
notes 11-29; infra text accompanying notes 79-92.
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However, despite the aggressiveness, 66 entrepreneurial na-
ture, and intellectual inventiveness of plaintiffs' lawyers in the
United States, lawyers and courts in the United States have hardly
ventured into the vast ocean of "non-traditional" claims, and the
few that have almost always have been forced to turn back not far
from the familiar shores. Claims against public authorities are lim-
ited by governmental immunity doctrines;67 claims for negligent
infliction of pure economic loss are rarely allowed;68 claims for neg-
ligent infliction of pure emotional distress, if allowed at all, are
kept in check by limited relational duties; 69 and only limited rela-
tional duties to control or guard against the negligence of third par-
ties are recognized. 70 This has long been the state of tort law in the
United States, as is recognized in the prior restatements.71 There
has not been an explosion of litigation, or at least not more so than
in foreign jurisdictions. 72 In sum, in the United States, unlike in the
United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth, the general-duty
principle has never been launched into the vast ocean of "non-
66. See id. at 946.
67. See DOBBS, supra note 30, at 693-741.
68. See id. at 1282-87.
69. See id. at 835-52.
70. See id. at 874-903.
71. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OFTORTS §§ 314-324A (1934) (duty to aid or protect others); id. §
436 (negligent infliction of emotional distress); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 887 & 888 cmt. c
(1939) (immunities); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314-324A (1965) (duty to aid or protect
others); id. §§ 436-436A (negligent infliction of emotional distress); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 895A-J (1979) (immunities). The lack of an action for negligent infliction of pure eco-
nomic loss can be inferred from the failure of either of the prior Restatements to mention any
such possibility. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 906, 917, 924-32 (1934); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 906, 917, 924-32 (1965).
72. A recent extensive survey of nonfatal traumatic personal injuries in the United States
reported that only about one injury in ten results in a liability claim. Almost two.thirds of the
total liability claims were associated with motor vehicle accidents; 44% of those injured in motor
vehicle accidents made a liability claim. If motor vehicle accidents are excluded, only 7% of those
injured at work made a liability claim, and only 3% of those suffering non-work injuries made a
liability claim. A liability claim included dealing directly with the injurer or his or her insurer,
regardless of whether a lawsuit was initiated. DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR
ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 7-10 & n.3, 109 n.1, 120-21 (RAND, Document No.
R-3999-HHS/ICJ, 1991). The study concluded: "Americans' behavior does not accord with the
more extreme pictures of litigiousness that have been put forward by some .... [WMe did not
find statistically significant differences between Americans and Britons in initiating legal
claims." Id. at 110, 111. See also BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1996, at 26 (1997) (NCSC Pub. No. R-205)
(stating "there is no evidence of a tort litigation 'explosion."'); id. at 15-16 (describing civil litiga-
tion rates and trends in the United States as similar to those in other industrial nations); Tho-
mas A. Eaton et al., Another Brick in the Wallk An Empirical Look at Tort Litigation in the 1990s,
34 GA. L. REV. 1049 (2000); Deborah J. Merritt & Kathleen A. Barry, Is the Tort System in Cri-
sis?: New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO STATE L.J. 315 (1999).
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traditional" claims. Hence, there is no need to bring it under con-
trol.73
There is, however, a serious defect in the prior restatements'
treatment of the duty issue that needs to be fixed, which is the re-
verse of the problem that Stapleton imagines. The problem exists
on the continent of traditional claims, for which the Restatement
actually states the duty too narrowly. Neither Stapleton nor Gary
Schwartz-the Reporter for the General Principles project-notes
this problem. Stapleton assumes that courts in the United States
and abroad generally have adopted the general-duty principle for
physical injuries that do not involve "affirmative duties" to aid or
control the conduct of others.74 Schwartz affirms (in a backhanded
manner) the general-duty principle for such cases in sections 3 and
6 of his General Principles discussion draft.76 However, Stapleton
73. Cf. Eric A. Feldman, Blood Justice Courts, Conflict, and Compensation in Japan,
France, and the United States, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 651 (2000).
Most strikingly, in comparison to courts in the United States, those in France
and Japan have been significantly more responsive to plaintiffs' claims [for in-
fection with HIV-tainted blood]. When one looks beyond the courts to legal and
legislative action more broadly, the United States has been the least accepting
of the plethora of demands for recompense.
Id. (abstract of article); see also THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY: KEEPING THE FLOODGATES SHUT (Jaap
Spier ed, 1996) (discussing concerns about expanded tort liability in European countries). When
non-traditional claims have been recognized in the United States, the duties have been limited
relational duties and the decisions to create, expand, or limit them have been based on consid-
eration of a number of factors in addition to foreseeability, including:
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future
harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the com-
munity of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach,
and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (psychotherapist's duty to
warn person endangered by patient) (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal.
1968) (land occupier's duty to warn of hazards on her land)). Other cases have focused more on
the credibility of the claims and the need to define clear limits on liability. Compare Dillon v.
Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (expanding duty to avoid causing pure emotional distress), with
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989) (limiting duty to avoid causing pure emotional dis-
tress), and Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1969) (refusing to expand duty to avoid
causing pure emotional distress).
74. See Stapleton, supra note 1, at 945-49 & nn.14-15.
75. See Discussion Draft, supra note 49, § 3, § 6 & cmt. a. I agree with Goldberg and Zipur-
sky that the Discussion Draft goes too far in excising the concept of duty, with the result that
many sections in the draft are awkward, inconclusive, and misleading. Sea John C. P. Goldberg
& Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence, 54
VAND. L. REV. 657 (2001) 657. I sympathize with the reporter's (and advisers'?) decision not to
mention the duty requirement in section 3, the basic negligence section, and to ignore or down-
play it in section 6 and other sections dealing with the "traditional" physical injury cases. As
Gary Schwartz, the reporter, explains, given the general duty of care to avoid physical injury to
others' persons and property as a result of one's negligence, it is "superfluous" to state or discuss
the duty issue in a case involving physical injury, unless it is an "affirmative duty" situation,
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and Schwartz also assume, incorrectly, that the general-duty prin-
ciple was recognized in the prior restatements, and therefore that
its recognition in the Third Restatement does not represent a cor-
rection of any defect in the prior restatements.
I previously noted Stapleton's assertion that the Second Re-
statement, "reflect[ing] the dominant academic fashions of the
time," expressed a "skepticism about the role of the duty concept
and a preference for jury judgment,"76 and that it therefore "em-
brace[d] a general duty owed 'to the whole world' [which] left most
issues to be dealt with under the rubric of the other recognized ele-
ments of the tort, including 'legal cause.' -177 Schwartz similarly as-
serts:
since the duty issue immediately dissolves into the negligent-conduct (breach of duty) issue. See
Discussion Draft, supra note 49, § 6 cmt. a & Reporter's Note to cmt. a. It is also potentially
confusing and misleading to invoke the duty-breach mantra in such situations, as I ruefully
observe each year when grading my students' exams. Nevertheless, although section 3 is liter-
ally limited to cases involving physical injury, it is the basic section on negligence liability and
thus should not be so limited. Moreover, many readers may not notice this limitation, especially
since section 3 is presented as the basic section on the negligence cause of action.
Thus, among other revisions, the duty requirement should be explicitly stated in section 3, as
in Goldberg's and Zipursky's "section N," see Goldberg & Zipursky, supra, at 737. A subsequent
section, such as their section D1 or Schwartz's section 6, should state the general duty owed to
the world at large in physical-injury cases not involving affirmative duties and should explain, as
Schwartz's section 6 comment a does, that the general duty makes the duty issue a superfluous
and potentially misleading "nonissue" in such cases.
Goldberg and Zipursky's discussion of the Palsgraf case, in comment e to their section N,
overlooks the fact that Palsgraf was a physical injury case, for which Andrews' general-duty
principle, rather than Cardozo's narrow relational-duty principle, is the proper principle under
their section Dl. In fact, Goldberg and Zipursky are reluctant, superficial supporters of the
general-duty principle for physical injuries. Their "nexus" requirement, which is articulated as a
mysterious accretion to the duty-breach issues and replicates Cardozo's narrow relational.duty
principle and arguments, would nullify their section D1. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra, at
738-39.
76. Stapleton, supra note 1, at 945 (footnotes omitted).
77. Id. (footnotes omitted). Stapleton may have been misled by Schwartz's treatment of this
issue in the Discussion Draft. See infra note 85 and text accompanying notes 78 & 85. The only
support that Stapleton provides for her assertion is a statement in comment d of the Second
Restatements first section that "[e]very man has a right, as against every other, not to have his
interest in bodily security invaded [by any type of tortious conduct]." See id. at 945 n.8. How-
ever, this statement, in a comment on "legally protected interests" in a definitional section de-
fining the word "interest," is part of an elaboration of the notion that different types of interests
are protected against different types of tortious conduct, rather than a statement about any
general duty owed to the world at large not to negligently cause any physical injury. The pur-
pose of the comment is to note that while some interests (such as the interest against bodily
security) are protected by tort law against all types of tortious conduct, other interests (such as
the interests in not suffering purely dignitary, economic, or emotional injury) are only protected
against intentional injury, and other interests (such as the interests in not being embarrassed or
properly criticized) are not protected against any type of tortious conduct. The comment is fo-
cused on the issue raised by section 281(a), which is whether the type of interest that was in-
jured is protected against the negligence type of tortious conduct (in the abstract), rather than on
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The Restatement Second of Torts tended to regard duty as a nonissue [i.e., as a
general duty owed to the world at large], except for problems of affirmative duty.
Its definition, in § 281, of "The Elements of a Cause of Action for Negligence" does
not include any explicit duty element.78
Both of these assertions are clearly incorrect.
There is a long-standing debate, most famously argued in the
opinions of Chief Judge Cardozo and Judge Andrews in the Palsgraf
case,7 9 over whether the duty of reasonable care in negligence law
normally is, or should be, conceived as (1) a general duty that is
owed to the "world at large" (Andrews' view)80 or (2) a particular-
ized "relational" duty that is owed only to those persons who were
within the class of persons foreseeably put at risk of suffering the
types of foreseeable injuries that made the defendant's conduct
negligent (Cardozo's view).81 Many of the principal advisers for the
drafting of the prior restatements were strong proponents of the
relational "harm within the risk" limitation on negligence liability,
although they disagreed on whether it should be a duty limitation
or a legal-cause limitation. 2 The proponents of the duty version of
the limitation won out in the drafting of the prior restatements.
Restatement Second section 281, which states the elements of the
negligence cause of action, declares:
The actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another, if:
(a) the interest invaded is protected against unintentional invasion, and
(b) the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to the other, or a class of per-
sons within which he is included, and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and
(d) the other has not so conducted himself as to disable himself from bringing an
action for such invasion [by being contributorily negligent].3
the issue addressed by section 281(b), which is whether only foreseeable plaintiffs or the world at
large are protected against a negligently caused invasion of that interest. Se infra text accom-
panying notes 83-84.
78. Discussion Draft, supra note 49, § 6 cmt. a, Reporters Note at 88.
79. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
80. Id. at 101, 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 99-100. Contrary to a widely held belief, Cardozo's duty analysis does not seem to
have been intended to shift power from juries to judges. See supra note 53.
82. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1763-66, 1769 & n.140, 1771 & n.149.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965) (emphasis added). The comment on
clause (d) states, "The rules which determine whether the other's conduct is such as to disable
him from bringing an action for [a negligent invasion of his protected interest] are stated in §§
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Comment c elaborates on clause (b):
Risk to class of which plaintiff is member. In order for the actor to be negligent
with respect to the other, his conduct must create a recognizable [foreseeable] risk
of harm to the other individually, or to a class of persons-as, for example, all per-
sons within a given area of danger-of which the other is a member. If the actor's
conduct creates such a recognizable [foreseeable] risk of harm only to a particular
class of persons, the fact that it in fact causes harm to a person of a different class,
to whom the actor could not reasonably have anticipated injury, does not make the
actor liable to the persons so injured.8 4
Schwartz recognizes that clause (b) expresses the "foreseeable
plaintiff' requirement, which is a major part of Cardozo's narrow
relational-duty principle, but he argues, "Whether this 'foreseeable
plaintiff requirement is an aspect of the doctrine of duty or instead
of the doctrine of proximate cause is a point that the Comment to
§ 281(b) does not make clear."'8 5
Yet it is quite clear that the phrase "negligence with respect
to the other" in section 281(b) refers to the negligent-conduct
(breach of duty) issue rather than to the proximate-cause element
or the negligence cause of action as a whole (which would make sec-
tion 281 viciously circular). The proximate-cause element is stated
separately in section 281(c), using the Restatement's preferred
phrase "legal cause" rather than "proximate cause." Furthermore,
section 281 comment a explicitly states, "Clauses (a) and (b) state
the conditions necessary to make the actor's conduct negligent.
Clauses (c) and (d) state the conditions which are necessary to
make negligent conduct actionable." The point is made even more
explicitly in the first section on legal causation, section 430, and its
comments. Section 430 states:
In order that a negligent actor shall be liable for another's harm, it is necessary
not only that the actor's conduct be negligent toward the other, but also that the
negligence of the actor be a legal cause of the other's harm.86
Comment a to section 430 adds Cardozo's "foreseeable type of haz-
ard" requirement to the "foreseeable plaintiff' requirement and em-
phasizes that both of these requirements are elements of the negli-
463 to 496." Id. § 281 cmt. 1. Sections 463 to 496 deal with the defense of plaintiffs contributory
negligence.
84. Id. § 281 cmt. c.
85. Discussion Draft, supra note 49, § 6 cmt. a, Reporter's Note at 88. Schwartz similarly
discounts the statement in the Scope Note to Topic 4 in the Second Restatement, which encom-
passes section 281, that "conduct which is negligent.., does not result in liability unless there is
a duty owed by the actor to the other not to be negligent." Id. (emphasis added). He does not
mention the comments and reporter's notes that are cited infra in note 88.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965).
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gent-conduct (duty-breach) analysis, which is distinct from, and
precedes, any issue of actual or legal causation:
Relation of negligence problem to cause problem. The conditions which are neces-
sary to make the act negligent in respect to the harm of which the other complains,
as set forth in § 281, Clause (b) and Comment thereon, may be summarized as fol-
lows:
The actor's conduct, to be negligent toward another, must involve an unreasonable
risk of:
(1) causing harm to a class of persons of which the other is a member and
(2) subjecting the other to the hazard from which the harm results.
Until it has been shown that these conditions have been satisfied and that the ac-
tor's conduct is negligent, the question of the causal relation between it and the
other's harm is immaterial .... 87
Comments to various sections of the Second Restatement, including
the basic negligence section, section 281, explicitly describe the
foreseeable plaintiff and type of hazard requirements as limitations
on the scope of the defendant's duty.8a
The First Restatement contained almost identical language
in almost all of the same sections and comments. 89 The only signifi-
cant difference was in the wording of section 281(b), which stated
87. Id. § 430 cmt. a; see id. § 430 cmts. b, c.
88. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmts. e & h, § 435 cmt c (1965); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, APPENDIX § 281(b) Reporter's Note at 305 (1966) ("The lead-
ing case supporting Clause (b) is Palsgraf.... the facts of which are stated in Illustration 1."); 3
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, APPENDIX § 435 Reporter's Notes at 151-52 (1966) CThe
question of the effect of the unforeseeability of the impact or harm itself is inextricably inter-
woven with that of duty to the plaintiff. See § 281(b), and Comments and the Note to that Sec-
tion."). Stapleton quotes the relevant language in the cited comments, yet she does not note that
they conflict with her assumption that the Restatement adopts an unlimited general duty of
care. See Stapleton, supra note 1, at nn. 86, 97, 123. At one point, she seems to acknowledge that
the Restatement imposes a 'harm within the risk" or "foreseeable hazard" limitation on the duty
of care in all negligence actions, but she dismisses the Restatement's duty approach to the "fore-
seeable hazard" limitation as "cryptic and confused," "incoherent," and "circular." See id. at 991
& nn. 123 & 125, 994.
89. The First Restatement did not contain the explicit duty language that is in the com-
ments cited at supra note 88 until 1948, when the initial versions of the Second Restatement's
comments e and h to section 281 were added to the First Restatement as comments e and ce,
respectively, and comment c was added to section 435. RESTATE21.ENT OF THE LAW, 1948
SUPPLEMENT, Torts § 281 cmts. e & ee at 650-51 (1949); id. § 435 cmt. c at 737. A reporter's note
to section 281 on "Reason for Change" contains the Restatements strongest statement of both
the harm-matches-the-risk rule and its adoption as a duty limitation. See id. at 651-52. The
reporter for the 1948 amendments was Laurence Eldredge, see id. at iv, who was one of the
strongest proponents of the harm-matches-the-risk rule. See Wright Causation, supra note 3, at
1771 & nn.146, 148-49.
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that an actor is liable under the negligence cause of action for an
invasion of an interest to another only if "(b) the conduct of the ac-
tor is negligent with respect to [the interest invaded] or any other
similar interest of the other which is protected against uninten-
tional invasion."90 This wording was meant to add a foreseeable
type-of-interest-injured requirement to the foreseeable plaintiff and
foreseeable type-of-hazard requirements that were elaborated (as in
the Second Restatement) in comments c and e on clause (b). The
foreseeable type-of-interest-injured requirement was elaborated in
comment g on clause (b), which reflected Cardozo's argument in
Palsgraf that the hazard encompassed by the defendant's duty of
care should be limited to the particular type of interest that was
foreseeably and tortiously put at risk, e.g., an "interest in person-
ality" versus an "interest in land or chattels."9' The illustration fol-
lowing comment g was a variation on the facts in Palsgraf, in which
the risked injury was to the boarding passenger's packages, which
were "obviously fragile" and likely to be dropped, and the dropped
package-which, unbeknownst to the conductor, contained fire-
works-exploded and injured the boarding passenger's eyes. 92
The essential identity between the First Restatement's ap-
proach and Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf could hardly be clearer.
Neither the First Restatement nor its successor recognized a gen-
eral duty of care, owed to the world at large, for any type of injury.
Each adopted Cardozo's view rather than Andrews'. I agree with
Schwartz and Stapleton that most courts in the United States rec-
ognize (and always have recognized) a general duty for physical
injuries that do not involve affirmative obligations to aid or control
others. In the General Principles draft, the Restatement finally ac-
knowledges that reality. However, it does not acknowledge, as it
should, that this is a significant change from the prior restate-
ments. At the very least, it should not explicitly misrepresent the
position of the prior restatements on this issue, as it now does.
90. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 281(b) (1934) (emphasis added).
91. See id. § 281 cmt. g; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, APPENDIX § 281 cmt. j, Ro-
porter's Note at 307 (1966) (noting that comment j reversed the position taken by comment g in
the First Restatement, which "was based primarily upon the [relevant] language of Cardozo,
C.J., in Palsgraf ....").
92. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 281 cmt. g, illus. 3.
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IV. CAUSAL CONTRIBUTION
A. The Restatement's Tests
As we have seen, the Restatement's concepts of "legal cause"
and "substantial factor" confusingly merge the empirical issue of
causal contribution and the normative issue of the extent of legal
responsibility for tortiously caused consequences, while providing
no useful guidance for resolving either issue.93 However, adhering
to Jeremiah Smith's original proposal,9' the Restatement does in-
corporate some tests of causal contribution, although it does not
label them as such. Restatement section 432 sets out two alterna-
tive, necessary but not sufficient, conditions for something to be a
"substantial factor":
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor's negligent conduct is not a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm would have been
sustained even if the actor had not been negligent.
(2) If two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's negligence, the
other not because of any misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient
to bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence may be found to be a
substantial factor in bringing it about.55
Subsection (1) states the familiar "but-for," "made a difference,"
necessary-condition test of causal contribution. ss Subsection (2)
states that a condition "may" be found to be a substantial factor if it
is one of two (or more) actively operating forces, each of which "of
itself is sufficient" for the occurrence of the injury.
Subsection (2) is based on cases such as Anderson v. Min-
neapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co., 97 and Kingston v.
Chicago & Northwestern Railway,98 in which two fires, each of
which was or may have been independently sufficient to burn down
the plaintiffs house, joined together to burn down the house, and
Corey v. Havener,9 9 in which two motorcycles, emitting steam, si-
93. See supra text accompanying notes 5-30.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1965). The First Restatement contained iden-
tical language, except it had the words "held by the jury" in place of the word "found in subsec-
tion (2). RESTATEMiENT OF TORTS § 432 (1934).
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 cmt a (1965) (interpreting section 432(1) as
a "necessary antecedent" test).
97. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn.
1920).
98. Kingston v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 211 N.V. 913 (Wis. 1927).
99. Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69 (Mass. 1902).
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multaneously roared noisily and at a high rate of speed by either
side of the plaintiffs wagon, startling the horse pulling the wagon
with resulting injuries to both the plaintiff and the wagon. The re-
quirement that each force be sufficient "of itself' is not meant to
require that each force be sufficient all by itself in the absence of
any other contributing condition. Few if any conditions are suffi-
cient in this strong sense. It merely requires that each force be "in-
dependently sufficient"-that is, sufficient independently of the
other competing force (e.g., the other fire or the other noisy motor-
cycle), but in conjunction with the other causally relevant condi-
tions (e.g., oxygen and fuel to feed the fires, or air to transmit the
noisy sound and animal ears to hear the sound).0
The independently-sufficient condition test in section 432(2)
is necessary to avoid the absurd conclusions, which would be re-
quired under the necessary-condition (but-for) test in section 432(1)
that:
(1) neither fire contributed to the destruction of the plain-
tiffs house in Anderson or Kingston because, if either fire
had been absent, the house would or might have been de-
stroyed anyway by the other fire; and
(2) neither noisy motorcycle contributed to the damage to the
plaintiffs wagon in Corey because, if either motorcycle
had been absent or quiet, the horse would have or might
have bolted anyway due to the other noisy motorcycle.
That is, contrary to what is often stated,101 although the necessary-
condition (but-for) test works well as an inclusive test for identify-
ing contributing conditions, it cannot be relied upon as a test for
excluding a condition as a possible cause; rather, it must be sup-
plemented by the independently-sufficient-condition test.
However, there are several problems with the Restatement's
formulation of the independently-sufficient-condition test. First, it
does not clearly distinguish cases of duplicative causation, such as
Anderson, Kingston, and Corey, in which the different competing
forces reinforced one another, from cases of preemptive causation, in
which one competing force preempted the potential causal effect of
the other. For example, assume in Anderson and Kingston that the
100. For a discussion of the different (weak, strong, and strict) senses of necessity and suffi-
ciency, see Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 3, at 1020-21.
101. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, at 266.
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other fire had reached the plaintiffs house and burned it down be-
fore the defendant's negligently set fire reached it. Clearly, the
house was destroyed by the other fire, and not by the defendant's
fire, which would have been sufficient if it had not been preempted
but was not actually sufficient since it arrived too late.10 2 Section
432(2) does require that each force "of itself is sufficient" and thus
may correctly require actual sufficiency rather than would-have-
been sufficiency. Yet this interpretation of section 432(2), which
saves us from the absurd conclusion that the defendant's fire
(which arrived too late) contributed to the destruction of the house,
forces us into the equally absurd conclusion that neither fire con-
tributed to the destruction of the house. Why? Because section
432(2) requires, in order for either fire to be a cause, that "each
[force] of itself [be] sufficient." This defect in the wording of section
432(2) can and should be remedied, by merely requiring that the
tortious force be actually sufficient, independently of the other
competing force but in conjunction with the other relevant condi-
tions.
A second problem with section 432(2) is that it will only treat
"actively operating" forces as being independently sufficient, and
again only if both competing forces were actively operating. Neither
of these limitations can be justified as a matter of empirical causal
contribution (or even as a general limitation on legal responsibil-
ity). For example, assume a chain has a maximum load capacity of
200 pounds, so that putting more than 200 pounds on the chain will
cause it to break. Through improper storage and maintenance, Bob
knowingly or negligently allows a link in the chain to get rusty. The
link is thereby weakened, such that the chain will only hold 150
pounds without breaking. Carol, who is aware of the load limit, but
unaware of the chain's weakened condition, deliberately or negli-
gently puts 220 pounds on the chain. The chain breaks at its rusty,
weakened link. Section 432(2) would incorrectly deny that the
rusty, weakened link (which is a passive condition caused by Bob's
inaction) contributed to the chain's breaking, even though (1) the
chain broke at the rusty, weakened link and (2) the rusty, weak-
102. Language from a recent case is praised by David Robertson as "capturling] the thought
[of an independently sufficient force] perfectly." Robertson, supra note 13, at 1778. However, the
language he quotes is far from perfect: 'When two causes concur to bring about an event, and
either cause, operating alone, would have brought about the event absent the other cause, the
appropriate test is the "substantial factor" test." Id. (quoting Magee v. Coats, 598 So.2d 531, 536
(La. CL App. 1992)) (emphasis added). Note the circular references to "cause(s)," the reliance on
the unhelpful and misleading substantial-factor formulation, and the failure to distinguish du-
plicative causes from preempted conditions (non-causes).
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ened link was actually sufficient to cause the chain to break inde-
pendently of Carol's putting 20 excess pounds on the chain. Worse
yet, since section 432(2) requires in order for either condition to be a
cause that each be an actively operating force, section 432(2) would
also incorrectly deny that Carol's putting 20 excess pounds on the
chain contributed to the chain's breaking, even though the 20 ex-
cess pounds were actually sufficient independently of Bob's allow-
ing the chain to become weakened. Again, this defect in the wording
of section 432(2) can and should be remedied, by eliminating the
"actively operating forces" language.
The third problem with section 432(2) cannot be so easily
remedied. The problem is that, even when the independently-
sufficient-condition test in section 432(2) is shorn of its excess ver-
biage and combined with the necessary-condition test stated in sec-
tion 432(1), the resulting "necessary or independently sufficient
condition" test is still only an inclusive rather than an exclusive
test of causal contribution. For, it is clear that conditions can be
causes (contributing factors) even if they were neither necessary
nor independently sufficient for the occurrence of the plaintiffs in-
jury. So the court correctly held in Warren v. Parkhurst.10 3 Each of
the twenty-six defendant mill owners in Warren discharged "sewage
and other foul matters" into a creek above the plaintiffs land. The
court stated that the amount discharged by each defendant was it-
self "merely nominal" and would not have caused any injury to the
plaintiff. However, the court noted, the stench from the combined
discharges had destroyed the usefulness of the plaintiffs property.
The court concluded: "No one defendant caused that injury. All of
the defendants did cause it. '' 104 Although none of the defendants'
individual discharges, by itself, was either necessary or independ-
ently sufficient to produce the legal injury to the plaintiff, it again
would be absurd, as the court recognized, to conclude that none of
the discharges contributed to the plaintiffs injury.
This third problem is more widespread than one might think.
For example, although we assumed earlier that it had been estab-
lished in Anderson, Kingston, and Corey that the defendant's negli-
gence was independently sufficient for the occurrence of the plain-
tiffs injury, this seems to have been established only in Kingston.
The plaintiff in Anderson was not required to prove that the defen-
103. Warren v. Parkhurst, 92 N.Y.S. 725 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1904), affd, 93 N.Y.S. 1009 (A.D.
1905), affd, 78 N.E. 579 (N.Y. 1906).
104. Warren, 92 N.Y.S. at 725, 728.
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dant's fire was either necessary or independently sufficient for the
destruction of the plaintiffs property, but rather only that it was "a
material or substantial factor" in causing plaintiffs injury.10 5 Simi-
larly, the plaintiff in Corey was not required to prove that each de-
fendant's noisy (and steam-emitting) motorcycle was either neces-
sary or independently sufficient to startle the plaintiffs horse with
resulting damage to the plaintiff and his wagon, but rather only
that each defendant's noisy motorcycle "contributed to the in-
jury."06 These sorts of phrases are common in these types of situa-
tions, in both court opinions and legislative enactments. 107
It seems obvious in Anderson, Corey, and Warren that each
defendant's negligence contributed to the plaintiffs injury, as each
court held, since in each case the conditions created by each defen-
dant's negligence combined with, duplicated, or reinforced the
causal effect of the other competing condition(s)-the other fire(s),
the other noisy motorcycle, and the other discharges of sewage-
rather than having had their potential causal effect preempted by
the other competing condition(s). But in each case the "necessary or
independently sufficient condition!' test would deny causal contribu-
tion. We need a more inclusive test of causal contribution.
B. The NESS Test
I have previously expounded and defended a comprehensive
test of causal contribution that is known by its acronym: the NESS
(necessary element of a sufficient set) test. I have argued, and still
believe, that the NESS test fully captures the empirical concepts of
causation and causal contribution, 0 8 incorporates the necessary-
105. See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 46
(Minn. 1920).
106. See Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69, 69 (Mass. 1902).
107. See Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 3, at 1022-23 & n.112, 1038-39.
108. In a prior essay, Stapleton criticized my statements that the NESS test "captures the
essence of the concept of causation" but she misinterpreted my statements as being assertions
that the NESS test not only captures the essence of purely empirical causation or causal contri-
bution-causation in its core or central sense-but also all of the additional judgments of signifi-
cance, importance, and responsibility that are often layered on top of the issue of empirical
causal contribution in the ordinary uses of causal language. Stapleton, Perspectives, supra note
2, at 66 & n.13, 80; infra text accompanying notes 166-168, 172-174. I am puzzled by her misin-
terpretation of my statements, since those statements are made in articles in which I have (i)
strongly emphasized the need to distinguish the empirical issue of causal contribution from the
further issues of significance or responsibility and (ii) presented the NESS test as a test which
clearly is limited to the empirical issue of causal contribution. See, e.g., Wright, Causation, su-
pra note 3, at 1737-58, 1774-1813; Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 3, at 1002-1044. In the
same essay, Stapleton herself accepts the NESS test (in combination with the but-for test, which
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condition and independently-sufficient-condition tests, explains and
justifies our shared causal judgments in cases like Anderson, Corey,
and Warren, and helps us properly resolve the causal-contribution
issue in more controversial situations.109
The NESS test is a refinement and further development of
the concept of a causally relevant condition that was first proposed
in 1959 by Herbert Hart and Tony Honor6." 0 As Hart and Honor6
noted, the core concept of (empirical) causation that we all employ
conforms with, and is explained by, the regularity account of causa-
tion that was first elaborated by David Hume and subsequently
modified by John Stuart Mill. Hume revolutionized philosophic
thinking on causation when he insisted, contrary to the then-
popular belief, that singular causal judgments are not based on di-
rect perception of causal qualities or forces inherent in objects or
events. No such perceptible quality or force has ever been identi-
fied. Instead, causal judgments are based on the belief that a cer-
tain succession of events fully instantiates one or more causal laws
or generalizations, which in turn are induced from empirical obser-
vation and experimentation. A causal law would list in the antece-
dent (the "if' part of the causal law) all of the conditions that to-
gether are sufficient for the occurrence of the consequent (the
"then" part of the causal law). A causal generalization is an incom-
pletely described causal law. To avoid including causally irrelevant
conditions in the antecedent, the conditions included in the antece-
dent must be restricted to those that are necessary for the suffi-
ciency of the antecedent. Thus the necessity requirement is subor-
dinate to the sufficiency requirement. To this Humean analysis,
Mill added the observation that there may be a plurality of distinct
sets of conditions that are each sufficient to produce the conse-
quent, both in general and on a particular occasion, so that there is
no unique sufficient set."'
This basic concept of causation is formalized in the NESS
(necessary element of a sufficient set) test of causal contribution,
which, in its full form, states that a condition contributed to some
consequence if and only if it was necessary for the sufficiency of a
is merely a corollary of the NESS test) as an appropriate, apparently comprehensive test of em-
pirical causal contribution. See, e.g., Stapleton, Perspectives, supra note 2, at 63, 67 n.15, 78.
109. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1788-1803; Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 3,
at 1018-42.
110. See HART & HONORt, supra note 34, at 110-14, 122-25, 235-53; H.L.A. HART & A.M.
HONOR9, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 104-08, 116-19, 216-29 (1959).
111. See HART & HONORk, supra note 34, at 10-11, 14-22; Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at
1789-90, 1823; Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 3, at 1019-20, 1031-34, 1045-46.
1102 [Vol. 53:3:1071
ONCE MORE INTO THE BRAMBLE BUSH
set of existing antecedent conditions that was sufficient for the oc-
currence of the consequence. 112 The relevant notion of sufficiency is
not merely logical or empirical, but rather requires that each ele-
ment of the applicable causal generalization, in both the antecedent
("if' part) and the consequent ("then" part) must have been in ac-
tual existence (concretely instantiated) on the particular occa-
sion."
3
The NESS test subsumes and integrates the Restatement's
necessary-condition test and its (cleaned up) independently-
sufficient-condition test, which are merely corollaries of the NESS
test that apply in certain types of situations. The NESS test re-
duces down to the necessary-condition (but-for) test if there was
only one set of conditions that was or would have been sufficient for
the occurrence of the consequence on the particular occasion, or, if
there was more than one such set, if the condition was necessary for
the sufficiency of each of the sets. Yet the NESS test is more inclu-
sive than the but-for test. A condition was a cause under the NESS
test if it was necessary for the sufficiency of any actually sufficient
set, even if, due to other duplicative (actually sufficient) or pre-
empted (would have been sufficient) sets of conditions, it was not-
as required by the but-for test-necessary in the circumstances for
the consequence.
The independently-sufficient-condition test is simply an ap-
plication of the NESS test in appropriate situations. Implicit in the
independently-sufficient-condition test is the requirement that the
112. This formulation, which requires that the NESS condition be necessary for the suffi-
ciency of a sufficient set, is more carefully worded than my prior canonical formulations, which
merely required that the condition be a necessary element of a sufficient set. See Wright, Causa-
tion, supra note 3, at 1790; Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 3. at 1019. However, I have al-
ways insisted that the condition must be necessary for the sufficiency of the set. See id. Most
readers likely will not see any analytic difference between the two versions, but the more care-
fully worded version is needed to avoid certain technical philosophical objections, which I thank
Richard Fumerton and Ken Kress for bringing to my attention. See Richard Fumerton & Ken
Kress, Causation and the Law: Preemption, Lawful Sufficiency and Causal Sufficiency. 64 LMII &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2001).
113. I again thank Richard Fumerton and Ken Kress for pointing out that I needed to be
more explicit than I previously have been in describing the sense of sufficiency that is employed
in the NESS test. See Fumerton & Kress, supra note 112. As should be clear from my earlier
articles, I have always viewed the NESS test as embodying not merely a requirement of logical
or even empirical necessity or sufficiency, but also a notion of causal directionality according to
which the conditions specified in the antecedent (if' part) of the causal generalization are caus-
ally relevant conditions for the occurrence of the condition specified in the consequent C'then7
part), but not vice versa, and a notion of causal sufficiency which requires that all the conditions
specified in the antecedent and the consequent be concretely instantiated on the particular occa-
sion. See, eg., Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1789, 1803-04, 1808-09, 1823; Wright, Bram-
ble Bush, supra note 3, at 1019, 1041-43, 1045-46, 1049-53.
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condition at issue be necessary for the sufficiency of the set of ex-
isting antecedent conditions of which it, but not the competing con-
dition, is a part. Without this requirement, totally irrelevant condi-
tions, such as the fact that the person who negligently started an
independently sufficient fire had a pink ribbon in her hair, could be
treated as independently sufficient conditions merely by adding
them to an already sufficient set of existing antecedent conditions.
The NESS test can be used, and implicitly is used, to confirm
the independent sufficiency of each fire in cases such as Kingston,
114
in which the two large fires merged to burn down the plaintiff's
house. Each fire was necessary for the sufficiency of a set of exist-
ing antecedent conditions that contained it but not the other fire.
The two sets overlap to a considerable extent, since they share such
existing necessary conditions as oxygen, fuel to burn on the route to
the house, lack of a downpour, the fire's reaching the house while
there is still a house left to burn, etc. Since the set containing each
fire was fully instantiated, the two fires are duplicative causes of
the destruction of the plaintiffs property.
On the other hand, if one of the fires arrived first and burned
the house down before the second fire arrived, only the first fire was
independently sufficient. It was necessary for the sufficiency of an
actually sufficient set that contains it but not the second fire. The
second fire was not independently sufficient, since the set contain-
ing it but not the first fire was not fully instantiated. Remember
that sufficiency means complete instantiation of the applicable
causal generalization for destruction of the house by a fire. That
causal generalization includes, as a necessary element, the fire's
reaching the house while there is still a house left to burn. That
element was instantiated, along with all the other elements of the
causal generalization, for the set that includes the first fire but
does not include the second fire. It was not instantiated for the set
that includes only the second fire. The second fire would have been
sufficient if the first fire had not existed, but it was not actually
sufficient since the first fire did exist and preempted the potential
causal effect of the second fire.
Hart and Honor6's elaboration of the NESS test developed
the test to this point. However, they failed to note that it could be
developed further, and they imposed restrictions upon it that pre-
vented it from reaching its full potential as the complete, compre-
hensive test of causal contribution. They apparently assumed that
114. See supra text accompanying note 98.
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in order to be a causally relevant condition, the condition had to be
either necessary or independently sufficient for the occurrence of
the consequence. 115 In addition, they added some normative glosses
to the test to avoid findings of causal contribution that would con-
flict with commonsense "causal" judgments in certain types of
situations. They deemed the NESS test to be inapplicable to rea-
sons for action or inaction or to the mere "provision of opportuni-
ties" for others to act." 6 They refused to treat a NESS condition as
a causally relevant condition if the connection between the NESS
condition and the consequent was an analytically necessary connec-
tion, such as the condition of one's being married being analytically
and empirically necessary (but not sufficient) for one's being a
widow," 7 or Stapleton's favorite example of an assassin's great-
grandmother's having a child being necessary (at least prior to
modern developments in genetic engineering) for the assassin's be-
ing alive and shooting the President." 8 They refused to treat excess
speed as a causally relevant condition if the excess speed (in the
past or present) merely coincidentally brought the person causing
or suffering some injury to the place where the injury occurred at
the precise time that the injury occurred, even though the injury
would not have occurred if the person had not been at that place at
that time." 9
115. See HART & HONOR, supra note 34, at 123-24, 125, 206-07, 235-39, 245, 249; Wright,
Causation, supra note 3, at 1791-92.
116. See HART & HONORt, supra note 34, at 22-23, 51-61, 111, 129, criticized in Wright, Cau-
sation, supra note 3, at 1748 & n.44. Honord continues to insist on this restriction. See HonorS,
supra note 45, at 363, 364 & n.6, 382-84. Without mentioning it or the other restrictions in the
text, none of which I accept, he describes his version of the NESS test as being only "marginally
different" than my version, insofar as I might require that there be a time gap between each
antecedent condition and the consequent, rather than allowing, as he does, at least some of the
antecedent conditions to persist to the time when the consequent occurs. See id. at 366. I did not
mean to exclude such persistence, or even (the theoretical or science-fiction possibility of) back-
ward-in-time causation, although it is useful and in accord with practical reality to think of the
word "antecedent' in the NESS test in terms of temporal priority (which does not exclude but
rather often assumes persistence of the temporally prior condition up to and even beyond the
time that the consequent occurs). What I mean to emphasize by the word "antecedent" is that
the condition appears in the antecedent C'if' part) of the causal law or generalization, rather
than in the consequent C'then" part).
117. See HART & HONORt, supra note 34, at 114-15.
118. Stapleton, Perspectives, supra note 2, at 67, 71 n.23, 72-75, 78 n.41; Stapleton, supra
note 1, at 948 n.15, 975-76, 977 n.88, 978 n.90, 986.
119. See HART & HONORt, supra note 110, at 114-16. As a result of criticism by John
Mackie, Hart and Honor6 retreated from this position in the second edition of their book. They
acknowledged that the excess speed is a causally relevant condition and that findings of "no
causal connection" in such situations depend on "proximate cause" extent-of-esponsibility argu-
ments framed in terms of a lack of a sufficient relationship between the negligently created risks
and the actual injury. See HART & HONORt, supra note 34, at.x-xviii-x.xxix, 121-22, 168-70.
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Discarding all of the restrictions that had been imposed on
the NESS test by Hart and Honor6, I attempted to demonstrate its
comprehensiveness as the test of causal contribution. The first task
was to demonstrate that the NESS test explains and justifies our
common judgment in the Warren case that each of the twenty-six
defendants' independent discharges of sewage was a cause of (con-
tributed to) the destruction of the downstream plaintiffs use of his
property, even though each individual's discharge by itself was
"merely nominal" and would not have resulted in any injury to the
plaintiff.120 Clearly, no individual defendant's discharge was inde-
pendently sufficient for the occurrence of the plaintiffs injury. Al-
though it is not explicitly stated by the court, it also seems clear
that no individual defendant's discharge was necessary for the oc-
currence of the plaintiffs injury. Yet each defendant's discharge
was a NESS condition. Some total number of discharges, N, where
N is much greater than one but less than twenty-six, was necessary
and sufficient for the plaintiffs injury. Each defendant's discharge
was necessary for the sufficiency of a set of existing antecedent
conditions which includes N-1 of the other defendants' discharges,
and the sufficiency of that set was not preempted, but rather was
reinforced, by the 26-N other defendants' discharges that were not
included in the description of the sufficient set. 121
As a matter of empirical causal contribution, the analysis
should not and would not change if there were only two defendants,
one of whom produced N of the discharges (the necessary and suffi-
cient amount), and the other of whom produced the remaining 26-N.
The first defendant's N discharges were independently sufficient.
The second defendant's 26-N discharges would also be independ-
ently sufficient if N is thirteen or less. If N is greater than thirteen
[e.g., fifteen], the second defendant's 26-N [e.g., eleven] discharges
were necessary for the sufficiency of a set of existing antecedent
conditions which includes, in addition to the second defendant's 26-
N [e.g., eleven] discharges, N-(26-N) [e.g., four] of the first defen-
dant's discharges. Again, the sufficiency of this set was not pre-
empted, but rather was reinforced, by the N-(N-(26-1V)) [e.g., eleven]
of the first defendant's discharges that were not included in the de-
scription of the sufficient set.
A non-numerical way of presenting the analysis in the pre-
ceding paragraph is to describe the minimally sufficient set con-
120. See supra text accompanying notes 103-104.
121. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1792-93.
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taining the second defendant's total discharge as a set which also
contains a total discharge by the first defendant "at least large
enough" to ensure that the antecedent of the applicable causal gen-
eralization is fully instantiated. Given this description of the first
defendant's total discharge, the second defendant's total discharge
was necessary for the sufficiency of the set and thus is a NESS con-
dition. Again, the portion of the first defendant's total discharge
that is left out of this description did not preempt, but rather rein-
forced, the sufficiency of the described set. The same method of
analysis can be used to establish that the defendant's fire in Ander-
son and each of the two defendants' noisy motorcycles in Corey
were, if not independently sufficient conditions, nevertheless still
NESS conditions for the occurrence of the plaintiffs injury in each
of those cases. 2 2 This analytic method is not a verbal trick or
sleight-of-hand. The description of the competing fire as a fire "at
least" so big or of the competing motorcycle noise as "at least" so
loud is a factual description of an antecedent condition that was
concretely instantiated on the particular occasion. 123
I can visualize the reader's eyes glazing and her head shak-
ing at this point. You are probably saying to yourself (and others)
that this technical method of analysis may be fine for ivory-tower
philosophers, but surely one cannot expect it to be applied by ju-
rors, judges, lawyers, law students, or even law professors.124 I
agree, as I have previously said.125 I have argued that, although one
cannot expect the NESS test to be applied or even fully understood
in all its technical rigor and (occasional) complexity, it does capture
the concept of causation that we tacitly employ in all our (purely
empirical) causal judgments. Therefore, a very useful understand-
ing can be gained of how to properly analyze and persuasively ar-
gue the empirical issue of causal contribution by merely grasping
the core notion of causation and causal contribution that is embod-
ied in the NESS test. This core notion is that an actual singular
instance of causation consists of a fully instantiated causal gener-
alization or "story," and that a particular condition was a contrib-
uting condition only if it was part of the complete instantiation of
the antecedent ("if' part) of an applicable causal generalization or
story.126
122. Id. at 1793-94; supra text accompanying notes 97-102, 105-107.
123. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1793-94; Bramble Bush, supra note 3, at 1035-
38 & n.194.
124. See DOBBS, supra note 30, at 417.
125. See Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 3, at 1038-39.
126. See id. at 1038-67.
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I have expressed the hope that, given the insights about cau-
sation and causal contribution that underlie the NESS test, a more
useful test of causation might be devised to replace the misleading
and completely question-begging "substantial factor" formulation
and the completely question-begging "contribution" formulation.
12 7
The following proposed Restatement section, which adds a third
test to the cleaned-up Restatement (Second) formulation, is the best
formulation that I have been able to come up with for the empirical
issue of causal contribution in tort law:
§ CC. Causal Contribution.
(1) The defendant's tortious conduct (or the plaintiffs negligent conduct) contrib-
uted to an injury if and only if each act, omission, and condition that must be
included in the description of the conduct in order to make it tortious (or neg-
ligent) contributed to the injury. 28
(2) An act, omission, or condition contributed to an injury if the act, omission, or
condition was:
(a) necessary for the occurrence of the injury (that is, without it the injury
would not have occurred), or
(b) independently sufficient for the occurrence of the injury (that is, suffi-
cient in combination with the existing non-competing conditions, but in-
dependently of and without being preempted by any competing condi-
tions), or
(c) a causally relevant part, no matter how minimal, of an actually com-
pleted (non-preempted) story of how the injury came about.
Comment on clause (1). A person's conduct does not include the person's state of
mind, even though one's state of mind shapes one's conduct. The negligent aspect
of a defendant's (or plaintiffs) conduct is the minimum change in the conduct that
is required to make it non-negligent. 28
Comment on clause (2). When analyzing the causal-contribution issue, always be-
gin with the necessary-condition test (which is the "but for" test when stated nega-
tively or the "made a difference" test when stated affirmatively). If the act, omis-
sion, or condition was necessary for the occurrence of the injury in the particular
circumstances (if, but for the act, omission or condition, the injury would not have
occurred), the act, omission, or condition contributed to the injury and no further
analysis of causal contribution is necessary.
127. See id. at 1039.
128. Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1766-71.
129. Id. at 1767-68.
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If it was not a necessary condition, but it nevertheless seems that it may have con-
tributed to the injury, try the independently-sufficient-condition test, making sure
to distinguish actually sufficient conditions from mere would-have-been sufficient
(preempted) conditions. Make sure that a condition or set of conditions which
seems to have been sufficient actually fully existed and was sufficient, rather than
having had its potential causal effect preempted by some other condition or set of
conditions. If the independently-sufficient-condition test is satisfied, the act, omis-
sion, or condition contributed to the injury and no further analysis of causal con-
tribution is necessary.
If neither the necessary-condition test nor the independently-sufficient-condition
test is satisfied, but causal contribution still seems plausible, consider whether
there is some causal story which might link the act, omission, or condition with the
injury that occurred in the particular situation. If not, the act, omission, or condi-
tion was not part of any possibly sufficient set of conditions and thus could not
have been a cause of the injury. If there is some possibly applicable causal story,
determine whether in the particular situation the causal story actually was fully
completed (instantiated), rather than being preempted by some other causal proc-
ess. Finally, determine whether the act, omission, or condition fits in, no matter
how minimally or bizarrely, as part of that actually completed causal story. If so,
the act, omission, or condition contributed to the injury. If not, it did not.
Jury instructions. When in the particular case there is no possibility of duplicative
or competing potential causes (contributing conditions), only the necessary-
condition (but-for) test needs to be given to the jury. Otherwise, all three tests, or
only the first and third tests, should be given to the jury.
C. Stapleton's Targeted But-For Test
Stapleton proposes an alternative test of causal contribution,
the "targeted but-for" test, which she describes as follows:
Tlake all factors existing at the time of the actual transition, including the factor
that we are investigating, say the tortious conduct of hunter X .... If there is a
notional sequence of removing factors from that set such that
" a stage is reached where, given the remaining factors the actual transition to
the outcome might still have occurred, but that
" the further removal of the targeted factor leaves a set that would not (in the
course of things that we now know happened) have produced the transition,
* then the targeted factor played a role in the history of the original transition.
One might crudely call this a test of sufficiency, but I prefer to call it the "targeted
but-for test" because, as the law tends to do, it focuses on the role of one factor at a
time and asks whether there is some perspective from which that factor can be
seen to have "made a difference."
This reduces to a simple forensic test that allows the plaintiff to ignore multiple
sufficient factors when proving that the defendant's tortious conduct was histori-
cally relevant to the outcome. For example, in the [situation in which two hunters
each negligently shoot the plaintiff with simultaneous fatal shots] the plaintiff can
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show that the tortious conduct of hunter X satisfies this test of historical involve.
ment in the victim's death. This is because (a) by notionally removing the tortious
conduct of hunter Y, the set of remaining factors is such that the victim would still
have died, but (b) the further removal of the tortious conduct of hunter X leaves a
set where the victim would not have died. If there is no notional sequence that
shows the targeted factor making such a difference ... then the factor ... played
no role in the history of the transition. 30
My initial reaction to the "targeted but-for" test was that it
might be the fairly simple method of practically implementing the
NESS test for which I had been hoping. However, upon reflection, I
realized that it was not. To begin with, the method is not so simple.
It critically depends on properly selecting and sequencing the no-
tional removal of factors, a mental process that, depending on the
particular situation, might or might not be less complicated than
the NESS test.
More significantly, Stapleton insists that her targeted but-
for test is different from (and more scientific than) the NESS test.131
It is different. However, the difference makes it inadequate and in-
ferior to the NESS test. Like the usual but-for test, the targeted
but-for test emphasizes necessity rather than sufficiency as the
most important aspect of our concept of empirical causation. It
gives the necessity aspect far too prominent a role by focusing (al-
beit in a cut-down, targeted form) on the necessity of the condition
130. Stapleton, supra note 1, 959-60 (footnotes omitted).
131. In her presentation at the Wade Conference, Stapleton distinguished her "scientific"
targeted but-for test from the "philosophic" NESS test. She now states that her targeted but-for
test "builds on" the NESS test, which she acknowledges is "the correct approach" to the empirical
issue of causal contribution. See id. at 959. She analogizes the targeted but-for test to "a series of
experiments that strip out one by one the factors to be studied" to determine whether their re-
moval "makes a difference" in the result. See id. at 956-60 n.44. While this is the scientifically
accepted experimental method for determining the causally relevant conditions in a causal law
or generalization, it is simply an application of the Difference Method that was elaborated by
Mill as the proper empirical procedure for determining the necessary elements of a causal law or
generalization - i.e., abstract NESS conditions. See JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF Looic, bk.
III, ch. V, § 3, ch. VII, ch. VIII, §§ 1-4, ch. X, §§ 1-3 (8th ed. 1872). Hence, while it is true that a
"scientist ... does not need to use causal language," Stapleton's claim that the assessment of
empirical causal contribution "neither requires nor is illuminated by 'causal theories" is not true.
See Stapleton, Perspectives, supra note 2, at 72 n.24. Moreover, it is not true, as Stapleton con-
tends, that "given an exhaustive set of such experiments, any over-determination will be re-
vealed." See Stapleton, supra note 1, at 960 n.44. The problems are not merely the ones that
Stapleton identifies: that we must replace actual experiments with thought experiments due to
"time and expense" and the inability of courts to "re-run cases involving human behavior," See
id. at961 n.48. The problem is that such experiments, whether in thought or for real, will not
enable us to determine which of several competing causal generalizations actually was instanti-
ated on a particular occasion, unless we employ a very fine-grained description of the result that
begs the causal question, and sometimes not even then. See infra text accompanying notes 145-
149.
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for the result (the "transition"),3 2 rather than subordinating the
necessity aspect to the sufficiency aspect, as the NESS test does, by
asking whether the condition was necessary for the sufficiency of
the set of antecedent conditions which, together, were sufficient for
the result.133
The targeted but-for test does seem to properly resolve the
easiest duplicative causation cases, such as her double-hit hunters'
case, in which each of two or more conditions was independently
sufficient for the occurrence of the result.134 The double-hit hunters'
case is Stapleton's only textual illustration of an over-determined-
causation situation in her article in this symposium. 35 Apart from
one exception to be discussed below, 36 it is also the sole illustration
in a previous essay, in which Stapleton repeatedly claimed that,
once the facts are known or agreed upon, the over-determined-
causation cases present no issue of causal contribution, but rather
only the normative issue of individual responsibility. 137 Indeed, she
declared that it is bizarre to view such cases as involving any issue
of causation as a question of fact. 138 In her article in this sympo-
sium, she wavers. She now acknowledges that the empirical issue of
causal contribution must be resolved in the over-determined-
causation cases before addressing the normative issue of the extent
of responsibility for consequences, but at the same time she insists
that the "characteristic problem" in such cases is not the former
issue but rather the latter issue. 39 She continues to assert that
"[tlhe challenge over-determined events pose for the legal system is
normative. Therefore, to describe this challenge, as traditional
analysis does, as one going to 'cause in fact' is dangerously mis-
leading and generates sterile debates."140
132. The result at issue often is not a transition to a new state but rather the maintenance of
an existing state. Even Hart and Honor6, upon whose "causal" theories Stapleton strongly relies,
state that, although the central notion of a "cause" is something which "makes a difference" by
producing some change in an existing state of affairs or course of events, the result we are inter-
ested in producing or explaining sometimes is the maintenance of an existing state of affairs.
See HART & HONOlP, supra note 34, at 29, 37. For example, watering plants or feeding people
contributes to their staying alive, and failing to salt a street contributes to its remaining icy.
133. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
134. See supra text accompanying note 130.
135. See Stapleton, supra note 1, at 958-60; see id. at 957 n.38. For discussion of the only
other illustration, which appears in a footnote, id. at 960 n.43, see infra note 149.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 150-160.
137. See Stapleton, Perspectimes, supra note 2, at 62-66, 77, 79-80, 81-84.
138. See id. at 77.
139. See Stapleton, supra note 1, at 967; ef. id. at 957 & n.38.
140. Id. at 966 n.60 (citations omitted).
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However, there are significant and sometimes difficult issues
regarding empirical causal contribution in the over-determined-
causation cases. The NESS test properly resolves these issues. The
targeted but-for test does not.141
The targeted but-for test will not reach the correct answer on
causal contribution when there are two duplicative causes, one of
which was necessary and independently sufficient for the occur-
rence of the injury and the other of which was neither necessary
nor independently sufficient. As noted above, this may have been
the situation in both Anderson, a merged-fires case, and Corey, the
noisy-motorcycles case.142 We have already seen that the NESS test
can be used to explain and justify the common judgment that each
fire or each noisy motorcycle contributed to the plaintiffs injury.143
The targeted but-for test could be used to establish that the inde-
pendently sufficient fire or noisy motorcycle contributed to the
plaintiffs injury, but it would erroneously conclude that the other
fire or noisy motorcycle did not contribute to the plaintiffs injury.
Regardless of the sequencing of the notional removal of factors, the
"transition" to no injury occurs only when the independently suffi-
cient fire or noisy motorcycle is removed.
A much more serious problem is the inability of the targeted
but-for test to distinguish situations involving duplicative causation
from those involving preemptive causation-an issue that exists in
every situation involving over-determined causation, even the
"easy" double-hit hunters' case. For example, assume that Bob, with
the intent to kill Mary, puts a deadly poison for which there is no
antidote in Mary's tea, which she is certain to drink in the next few
minutes (if not killed first), but before she drinks the tea Dave
shoots her with a fatal shot. It should be clear, without having to
explicitly apply any test of causal contribution, that Mary's death
was caused by the shooting and not by the poisoning of the tea. Yet
the targeted but-for test would treat Bob's putting the poison in the
tea, as well as Dave's shooting Mary, as a cause of Mary's death. If
one first notionally removes Dave's shot, the transition (Mary's
141. The targeted but-for test is not as wildly overinclusive as the aggregate but-for test that
is suggested in PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, at 268-69, and 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL.,
THE LAW OF TORTS 92 (2d ed. 1986), which would allow anything, no matter how causally irrele-
vant, to be treated as a cause merely by adding it to an already sufficient set of antecedent condi-
tions. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1780-81. But it shares with the aggregate but-for
test the inability to distinguish duplicative from preemptive conditions. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 144-149.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 105-107.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 121-123.
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death) would still have occurred as a result of Bob's putting the
deadly poison in the tea which Mary was certain to drink in the
next few minutes, but if one then subsequently removes Bob's poi-
soning of the tea, the transition (Mary's death) would not have oc-
curred. Thus, the targeted but-for test is satisfied and incorrectly
indicates that Bob's poisoning of the tea contributed to Mary's
death. The same problem exists even in the double-hit hunters'
case, which is easy only if one assumes the answer-that both
hunters' shots contributed to the victim's death-before posing the
question. 4
The NESS test and its corollary, the independently-
sufficient-condition test, reach the correct conclusion on causal con-
tribution. The set of conditions sufficient to cause death by shooting
(Mary's being alive, a shot, the shot entering a vital organ, etc.) all
actually occurred, and the shot was necessary for the sufficiency of
this set of conditions. Therefore the shooting was a cause of (con-
tributed to) Mary's death. On the other hand, the set of conditions
sufficient to cause death by poisoning (Mary's being alive, a deadly
poison, no antidote, the poison being put in the tea, Mary's drinking
the tea, the poison remaining in Mary's body a certain amount of
time while she is still alive, etc.) was not actually satisfied. Several
of the elements necessary to make the set sufficient were missing-
most obviously, Mary's drinking the tea. So the poisoning of the tea
did not contribute to Mary's death. The NESS test explains and un-
derlies our initial causal judgment, even though we usually have no
conscious, explicit awareness of the test.
Stapleton might argue that the targeted but-for test will
reach the correct conclusion regarding causal contribution in pre-
emption situations like the poisoned tea hypothetical if the result is
properly described as Mary's death at the time that it actually oc-
curred.14 I have commented elsewhere on attempts to save the but-
144. To determine whether the double-hit hunters' case "is indeed one of over-
determination," by which she apparently means duplicative rather than preemptive causation,
Stapleton does not apply her targeted but-for test, but rather applies a complete-instantiation
sufficiency test that is (inadequately) similar to the NESS test. She requires that it be proven
"that each gun discharged, that each shot a bullet that hit the victim, that each wound would
have been sufficient to kill, and so on." Stapleton, supra note 1, at 966 (emphasis added). This
test is still inadequate, since, to establish causal contribution, it must be proven that each wound
was sufficient to kill the victim, not merely that it would have been sufficient if the other wound
had not existed. See supra text following note 114.
145. This death-at-the-time-it-occurred argument appeared in note 42 of the paper that
Stapleton presented at the Wade Conference. It is not in the published note, which however
continues to state that one of the "two important variables that affect the answer to the 'histori-
cal involvement' question... is how the transition/end state/consequence is defined." Stapleton,
supra note 1, at 959 n.42; see id. at 957 n.38 (noting that, "[h]ad the event in the double-hit
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for test from failure by detailing the injury or the manner of occur-
rence (e.g., "death by two bullets"). The use of this technique as-
sumes the causal conclusion one is attempting to prove. It therefore
would allow one to prove that anything, no matter how causally ir-
relevant, contributed to the injury as so described (e.g., "death
while wearing pink suspenders"). 146 Moreover, the relevant legal
injury in tort law (or for homicide in criminal law) is not death at
any particular time, but rather death per se.1
47
But put that objection aside. Even this detailed-description
technique will not save the targeted but-for test from reaching the
incorrect conclusions on causal contribution when the death would
have occurred at the same instant as a result of a preempted would-
be factor. For example, assume that, if Mary had drunk the tea, she
would have died at precisely the same time that she actually died
as a result of the shot. The NESS test continues to reach the correct
conclusion on causal contribution, using exactly the same reasoning
as was described above. The set of conditions sufficient for death by
shooting was satisfied. The set of conditions sufficient for death by
poisoning was not. An element necessary to make the set sufficient
was missing-Mary's drinking the tea. 148 The targeted but-for test
continues to reach the incorrect conclusion. Applying the targeted
but-for test, we are forced to conclude that both the shot and the
poisoning of the tea contributed to Mary's death, even though the
poison never entered Mary's body.149
hunters case been defined as 'death by two bullets in the brain' the event would not have boon
over-determined"); Stapleton, Perspectives, supra note 2, at 82-83 (arguing that, in the desert
traveler hypothetical, "both enemies [could] be held responsible for the [traveler's] death ...
[given] a suitably widely specified outcome, for example 'death by lack of a supply of fresh [un-
poisoned] water' "); id. at 83 n.53 (discussing "death by dehydration").
146. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1777-80, 1807, 1823-24; Wright, Bramble Bush,
supra note 3, at 1025-26 & nn. 129 & 132, 1040 n.219.
147. The time of death will be relevant in calculating the damages suffered (e.g., the amount
of lost income), but the damages issue arises only after the negligence cause of action (including
the causal-contribution element) has been proven.
148. If Mary drank the tea, and the necessary time specified in the causal generalization for
the poison to be in her body while she was still alive elapsed at the same time that the (immedi-
ately) lethal shot entered her vital organ, then we would have to conclude that the death-by-
poisoning causal generalization and the death-by-shooting causal generalization were both fully
instantiated, so that the poison and the shot were duplicative causes of her death. The NESS
test can distinguish between this duplicative causation situation and the preemptive causation
situation described in the text, while the targeted but-for test cannot, precisely because it ignores
the crucial issue of sufficiency.
149. Stapleton suggests another patch to her targeted but-for test to enable it to handle the
preemption cases: "The only constraint on this test of historical involvement is that the plaintiff
is not allowed to remove a factor that had actually been present which had completely preempted
the relevant effect of the defendant's tortious conduct." Stapleton, supra note 1, at 960 n.43; see
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The poisoned-tea hypothetical is similar to the much-
discussed desert-traveler hypothetical, which Stapleton featured in
a previous essay.150 In this hypothetical, one enemy of a desert
traveler poisons the water in the traveler's water keg, a second en-
emy (not knowing that the water has been poisoned) empties the
poisoned water out of the keg, and the victim subsequently dies of
dehydration in the desert. Clearly, the traveler died of thirst as a
result of the emptying of the keg, rather than by poisoning, and the
first enemy's poisoning of the keg had nothing to do with the death.
It was a preempted condition rather than a duplicative cause of the
traveler's death.
Similarly to the poisoned tea hypothetical, the NESS test
reaches the correct conclusion on causal contribution, while the tar-
geted but-for test does not. Applying the NESS test, the set of ante-
cedent conditions sufficient for death by thirst all actually occurred,
and the emptying of the water from the keg was necessary for the
sufficiency of this set of conditions. The entire set of antecedent
conditions sufficient for death by poisoning did not actually occur.
Once again, several elements necessary for the sufficiency of this
set are lacking, most especially the drinking of the poison. So the
emptying of the water from the keg, but not the poisoning of the
water in the canteen, was a cause of (contributed to) the traveler's
death.151
Stapleton purports to find this conclusion surprising.5 2 She
makes a number of contrary arguments, none of which are valid.
First, she attempts to avoid the conclusion by modifying the hypo-
thetical:
The rationalization of Wright (of the view that only Enemy No. 2 was a cause of
the death) is flawed by its implicit reliance on the factual assumption that the poi-
id. at 1005 & n.168. She presents a hypothetical in which D2 replaces the bomb D1 had put
under Vs car with D2's own bomb. Her constraint would prevent one from removing Dffs
switching of the bombs when applying the targeted but-for test to D1's bomb. Id. The constraint
is circular. It is employed to avoid the targeted but-for test's being used to find that a preempted
condition was a cause, but it operates by assuming that is has already been determined that the
condition was not a cause because it was preempted. Rather than being an application of her
targeted but-for test, this ploy is merely a transparent refusal to apply the test in preemption
situations.
150. See Stapleton, Perspectives, supra note 2, at 82-84.
151. Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1802; Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 3, at 1024-
25; Honor6, supra note 45, at 377-79; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435A cmt. a (1965)
(giving as an example of a lack of a causal connection between tortious act and injury "a person
who, with murderous design, substitutes poison for the drinking water of a traveler, [who dies] in
a train wreck before he has had a chance to taste the potion").
152. See Stapleton, Perspectives, supra note 2, at 84 n.59.
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son was not pungent (and that therefore the plan of No. 1 was death by poisoning,
which plan was preempted by No. 2).10
She assumes that the poison was "so pungent the traveller
would never have drunk it."'154 She apparently assumes that the
first enemy's plan-like the second enemy's-was "death by dehy-
dration" rather than "death by poisoning' (but then why use a poi-
son?) and that, as so construed, the first enemy would then be a
NESS cause of the traveler's death.
155
There are several flaws in this argument. First, it ducks the
original hypothetical, which everyone assumes involves a first en-
emy whose plan is to poison the traveler using an undetectable (and
therefore non-pungent) poison. Second, even if the facts were as
Stapleton assumes, the first enemy's poisoning of the water still did
not contribute to the traveler's death, but rather was preempted by
the second traveler's emptying of the keg. The causal story (set of
antecedent conditions) sufficient for death by dehydration that in-
volves the first enemy includes, among other necessary conditions:
(1) someone's making the water pungent; (2) the traveler's becom-
ing aware of that pungency; (3) the continued availability of the
pungent water; and (4) the traveler's deciding not to drink the pun-
gent water because it is pungent. Setting aside the implausibility of
the traveler's choosing to die of thirst rather than drink the pun-
gent water, none of conditions (2) through (4) actually occurred, so
the causal story (set of antecedent conditions) that includes the first
enemy's making the water pungent was not completed (fully instan-
tiated), but rather was preempted by the causal story involving the
emptying of the keg, which was completed. 156
Stapleton also argues (and pressed this argument on me
during the Wade Conference) that the first enemy did contribute to
the traveler's death, as indicated by the targeted but-for test, or at
least could and perhaps should be held solely or jointly liable for
the traveler's death since, prior to the second enemy's emptying of
153. Id. at 84 n.60; see id. at 83 n.54.
154. Id. at 84.
155. See id. at 83 n.54, 84 n.60.
156. Stapleton and Fischer incorrectly assume that, when one applies the NESS test to ana-
lyze the sufficiency of a set of antecedent conditions, one ignores the existence or causal effect of
any actual condition that is not included in the description of that set and thus assesses causal
contribution "from the perspective of a hypothetical, fictitious set of circumstances." Id. at 83; see
id. at 84; Fischer, supra note 29, at 1359, 1362. As the discussion in the text indicates, and as I
have previously emphasized, when applying the NESS test one must always double-check to
make sure that the actual conditions that are excluded from the description of the supposedly
sufficient set of actual antecedent conditions do not in fact undermine the sufficiency of the de-
scribed set by preventing the instantiation of one or more of the necessary elements in that set.
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the keg, the first enemy's poisoning of the keg "doomed" the trav-
eler to die or, to put it another way, made the traveler's life expec-
tancy beyond the next few days nil.1 57 Stapleton's argument sug-
gests several distinct arguments, which she fails to distinguish
clearly:
1) Causing a reduction in a person's life expectancy is the
same as causing that person's death.
2) It is not only practically possible but also analytically and
normatively sound to hold a defendant individually re-
sponsible for having caused a person's death even if it is
clear that the defendant did not cause the death.
3) It is analytically and normatively possible, and perhaps
sound, to hold a defendant liable for the harm resulting
from a person's death, even if it is known that the defen-
dant did not contribute to the death, because the defen-
dant irrevocably reduced the person's life expectancy to
almost nil prior to the person's death.
4) It is analytically and normatively possible, and perhaps
sound, to hold a defendant liable for having irrevocably
reduced a person's life expectancy to almost nil, or for
having caused any substantial reduction in the person's
life expectancy, even if it is known that the defendant did
not contribute to the person's death.
The first two arguments are invalid. 158 The third and fourth
are valid and raise contestable normative issues; however, as
Stapleton recognizes, these issues have generally been resolved by
declining to hold the defendant legally responsible. With respect to
the third argument, Stapleton admits:
[I]f a person's behaviour was not relevant to the [empirical causal-contribution]
enquiry of how the outcome came about-because it was neither a but-for nor
NESS factor in relation to it-it will not be judged to have made a difference [i.e.,
157. See Stapleton, Perspectives, supra note 2, at 83 & nn.56 & 57, 84 & nn.62 & 63.
158. Stapleton herself provides a limited refutation of the first t.wo arguments, which focus
on the empirical issue of causal contribution. She observes:
The coherence of a perspective based on merely dooming a person depends on a
sufficient correspondence between the actual outcome and the specification of
the fate to which the defendant doomed the victim. If D1 infects V with a ter-
minal disease but V is then shot by D2, few if any would accept that D1 was in-
dividually responsible 'for the death.'
Id. at 83 n.58. Few if any would accept that Dl was responsible "for the death" because it is
clear that D1 did not contribute to the death. The refutation applies even if the actual outcome
precisely matches the doomed fate, once it is understood that one's being responsible "for the




be a basis for holding the person individually responsible] even if it is judged ab-
normal [tortious]." 159
With respect to the fourth argument, Stapleton seems to recognize
that allowing recovery for such "lost expectancies" of continued life
or "lost chances" of avoiding death that are not the result of any
physical injury, especially when death has not yet occurred or even
when death has occurred but it is clear that the defendant's action
did not contribute to the death, would expand legal liability far be-
yond its current limits.
160
The only context in which there has been widespread recog-
nition of liability for having tortiously caused the loss of a chance of
avoiding death is the medical malpractice area. The dominant trend
is to impose liability for having negligently caused the loss of such a
chance, but only after the death has occurred and if, unlike the des-
ert-traveler hypothetical, the negligence might have actually con-
tributed to the plaintiffs death. 161 In other contexts in which it is
inherently impossible or extremely difficult to prove or disprove
causal contribution, courts have sometimes shifted the burden of
proof to the defendant to prove a lack of causal contribution. In
each of these contexts, a conscious normative decision has been
made, on fairness and/or deterrence grounds, to allow partial or full
recovery for the injury, even though it is explicitly recognized that
it cannot be proven that the defendant's negligence contributed to
the injury, as long as it has not been proven that the defendant's
negligence did not cause the injury.162 Although the issue of
whether there should be an empirical causal-contribution require-
ment in tort law is a normative one, it is an issue that has been
overwhelmingly, indeed universally, answered affirmatively. In cer-
tain special contexts the requirement has been relaxed, as indicated
above, but it has never been abandoned. 163
159. See Stapleton, Perspectives, supra note 2, at 67 n.15.
160. See id. at 83 n.56.
161. See Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 3, at 1067-72. Even in the medical malpractice
context, courts which strictly construe their wrongful death statutes as requiring tortious causa.
tion of death hold that the statute does not apply where all that can be proved is causation of a
lost chance of survival. See, e.g., Weimer v. Hetrick, 525 A.2d 643, 651-52 & n.7 (Md. 1987)
(leaving open possibility of a common-law action); Kramer v. Lewisville Mem'l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d
397, 398, 404 (Tex. 1993) (also rejecting lost-chance action under survival statute and common
law).
162. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1809-21; Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 3,
at 1067-77.
163. This is true even in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989), in which
the New York Court of Appeals adopted the market-share theory of liability for birth defects
caused to plaintiffs by their mothers' ingestion of the drug diethylstilbestrol C'DES") during
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In any event, the issue with which we are concerned in this
part is not the normative issue of legal responsibility but rather the
empirical issue of causal contribution. Although Stapleton purports
to distinguish the empirical issue of causal contribution from the
normative issues that also enter into judgments of individual re-
sponsibility, her "new understanding of the nature of causation"'6
fails to do so. Stapleton declares:
The traditional lawyer's view is that usually you cannot be responsible for an out-
come without being causally connected to it, and that this causal connection has to
be established before you can construct a case for responsibility. In contrast, I ar-
gue that in legal disputes where the facts are agreed, it is notions of individual re-
sponsibility that determine the perspective a party adopts when looking at those
facts to identify what had made a difference in bringing about the relevant out-
come. In such cases, notions of individual responsibility can affect whether we call
something a "cause". Thus where such disputes are framed as disputes about cau-
sation, this merely masks the true nature of the dispute: a dispute which involves
competing notions of individual responsibility. '
Assuming that the over-determined-causation cases do not
present any issue regarding empirical causal contribution, but
rather only normative issues regarding individual responsibility,
Stapleton accuses those (especially me) who have attempted to
elaborate a comprehensive test to resolve the empirical issue of
causal contribution in such cases of "masking [the] dispute about
responsibility in terms of a dispute about the correct 'causal! test to
pregnancy. The court refused to let a defendant drug company avoid liability to an injured plain-
tiff (for a share of the harm equal to the defendant's share of the national market for the drug) by
establishing that it did not manufacture or supply the specific pills that the plaintiffs mother
ingested, although it would allow a defendant to avoid liability by establishing that it did not
market DES for use during pregnancy. See id. at 1078 & n.3. The New York court understood,
better than other courts, that the basic rationale behind the proportionate-liability rule based on
market share is that the defendant, by being held liable for its proportionate share of the market
in each individual case, is thereby being held liable (roughly) for the share of the total aggregate
injuries that it actually caused, and that to allow exculpation in particular cases would result in
the defendant's being held liable for less than the total injuries that it actually caused.
The New York court would allow the second-best market-share theory of liability to be pre-
empted by the traditional first-best theory of full liability if the plaintiff could prove that a par-
ticular defendant produced or supplied the specific pills that her mother ingested. See id. at
1073. This is proper, since a plaintiff who can prove which defendant actually caused her injury
should not have her traditional, first-best tort claim sacrificed to the mathematical integrity of
the second-best market-share scheme. Moreover, as is suggested by Justice Clark's dissenting
opinion in Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990), in which the majority refused to
adopt the market-share theory (due in part to its failure to ever address the basic rationale un-
derlying the theory), the adverse impact of the few first-best full-liability claims on the mathe-
matical integrity of the second-best market-share scheme can be lessened by alloing a defen-
dant which is held fully liable to bring a contribution action, based on market shares, against the
other manufacturers and suppliers of DES. See id. at 345, 349 (Clark, J., dissenting).
164. See Stapleton, Perspectises, supra note 2, at 62.
165. Id. at 81-82.
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apply."'166 Thus, she asserts that, once the facts in the desert-
traveler case are described, 1
6 7
[the] notorious disagreement among lawyers and philosophers . . . [which] has
typically been framed as a dispute about causation .... is in fact a dispute about
individual responsibility for an outcome: whether on those agreed facts the behav-
iour of the enemies should be seen as having 'made a difference' in responsibility
terms in relation to the traveller's death. 68
Treating the but-for and NESS tests of causal contribution
as merely two among many competing "visions" of individual re-
sponsibility, Stapleton runs through various "visions" or "perspec-
tives" whereby one or the other or both enemies could be held indi-
vidually responsible for the traveler's death. 169 Although she notes
the need to employ "concepts which will facilitate clear analysis" of
the responsibility issue, 170 her conceptual apparatus for assessing
individual responsibility borrows the vague, manipulable, and mis-
leading concepts of "what made a difference" and "abnormality"
from Hart and Honor6's "commonsense causal principles" for at-
tributing responsibility, which she supplements with additional ob-
scure concepts such as "comparator class," "perspective," and "vi-
sion."17' Like Hart and Honor6, she ends up confusing rather than
distinguishing the empirical issue of causal contribution and the
normative issues that also enter into determinations of legal re-
sponsibility.
Yet, remarkably, Stapleton cites me as a person who has in-
sufficiently distinguished the empirical issue of causal contribution
from the normative issue of legal responsibility in the over-
determined-causation cases. She quotes statements by me that
166. Id. at 84; see id. at 64, 66, 77, 79-80, 82; supra note 108; infra text accompanying notes
172-174. Stapleton cites Robertson's discussion of my criticism of the editors of the fifth edition
of Prosser's torts treatise, who blurred the distinction between actual-causation as a pure ques-
tion of fact and "proximate cause" as a normative issue of legal responsibility, to support her
assertion that describing the challenge posed by over-determined events "as one going to 'causa-
tion in fact! is dangerously misleading and generates sterile debates." See Stapleton, supra note
1, at 966 n.60 (citing Robertson, supra note 13, at 1766-67 & n.5 (discussing Wright, Causation,
supra note 3, at 1764 n.121)). In the portion of his article that Stapleton cites, Robertson sup-
ports the firm distinction that I draw between the two issues, although he thinks that my criti-
cism of the editors of the fifth edition, though valid, was overstated.
167. "Enemy No. 1 poisons V's water barrel. Later, an unassociated Enemy No. 2 empties
the barrel. Later still V dies of thirst." Stapleton, Perspectives, supra note 2, at 82 (italics re-
moved).
168. Id. at 82.
169. Id. at 82-84 (The Desert Traveller Case); supra text accompanying notes 152-160.
170. Stapleton, Perspectives, supra note 2, at 82.
171. See HART & HONORt, supra note 34, at 2, 29, 33-38, 41-42, 130-31, 183-85; Stapleton,
Perspectives, supra note 2, at 63-70; Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1745-50 & n.31 (dis-
cussing Hart and Honor6's causal theory).
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were directed solely to the issue of empirical causal contribution
and the use of the NESS test to resolve that empirical issue and
misrepresents them as claims that the NESS test should be used as
a policy-neutral "natural or universal test" for resolving the further
issue of legal responsibility for tortiously caused consequences. 1 2 In
one of the quoted statements, I declare that "the choice among [the
various] senses of necessity and sufficiency is not governed by pol-
icy considerations, but rather by how well each test corresponds
with our intuitive concept of causation."1 73 Stapleton comments:
It is not some mysterious "intuitive concept of causation" that underlies the law's
refusal to add necessity as a requirement in the certain over-determination cases
.... Rather, it is our sense of how and why responsibility should be allocated in
the case. This is something that can and should be expounded.1
74
The statements of mine that Stapleton quotes were ad-
dressed solely to the issue of empirical causal contribution. They
were made in the context of expounding the NESS test as the test
that tacitly underlies and renders non-mysterious our intuitive un-
derstanding of empirical causal contribution. At the beginning of
the section of my article from which she quotes, I stated:
Despite the lack of an explicit comprehensive definition of causation, people from
time immemorial have shown remarkable agreement in their causal judgments, at
least once they are clearly focused on the [empirical] causal issue rather than on
some noncausal inquiry regarding the (most significant for some purpose) cause. In
particular, judges and juries, when not confined by incorrect tests or formulas,
consistently have demonstrated an ability to make intuitively plausible factual
causal determinations ....
172. See Stapleton, supra note 1, at 966 & n.61; supra note 108 and text accompanying notes
166-168. Stapleton cites David Fischer as supporting her criticisms of my statements. See
Stapleton, supra, at nn.38 & 61 (citing Fischer, supra note 29, at 1356-60, 1384). Fischer de-
scribes my discussion of some applications of the NESS test as "providing examples of unfair but-
for results." See Fischer, supra note 29, at 1346 n.38 (emphasis added) (citing Wright, Causa.
tion, supra note 3, at 1793). However, in the cited examples, as in all of my discussions of the
NESS test versus the but-for test, I do not mention unfairness or the issue of ultimate responsi-
bility, but rather focus solely on the empirical issue of causal contribution. It is Fischer and
Stapleton, rather than I, who fail to distinguish these two issues and the proper tests for resolv-
ing each in the over-determined-causation cases. They assume that the empirical causation
issue is satisfied or can be ignored and thus drops away as a distinct issue, and they merge the
two issues into a single issue of whether to "retain the necessary [but for] cause requirement" or
instead to use the sufficiency (NESS) test or some other test, principle, or policy to resolve this
merged issue of "causation" or responsibility. See Fischer, supra note 29, at 1344-60; Stapleton,
supra note 1, at 957 n.38, 966-67 & n.60; Stapleton, Perspectitus, supra note 2, at 66, 80, 82-84.
Fischer's criticism of my application of the NESS test in some over-determined multiple-omission
situations is discussed infra text accompanying notes 191-214.
173. Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 3, at 1020, quoted in Stapleton, supra note 1, at 966
n.61.
174. Stapleton, supra note 1, at 966 n.61 (emphasis in original); see id. at 968 (arguing that
the decision "not to impose the necessity requirement' when determining ultimate responsibility
"can and should be explicitly defended").
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Some scholars rely heavily on this shared yet undefined concept of causation....
by grounding their arguments on intuitive responses to hypothetical situations.
Yet intuitions that are not conjoined with theory in a search for underlying princi-
ples are often inadequate for the hard cases and sometimes may mislead even in
the easy cases. In these situations in particular we would benefit greatly from
elaboration of the concept that, unarticulated and imperfectly understood, under.
lies the intuitive judgments ....
A better response, therefore, is to set forth a workable definition of causation....
Recently... a number of... philosophers have formulated substantively identical
definitions that capture the essence of the concept of causation by subordinating
the necessity requirement to the sufficiency requirement [the NESS test].,78
Stapleton seems to have overlooked an entire section of my
first article on causation, entitled Distinguishing the Damages Is-
sue: The Successive-Injury and Overwhelming Force Cases.176 In
that section, I directly addressed the normative issue of legal re-
sponsibility, which I distinguished (once again) from the empirical
issue of causal contribution. Through an analysis of the cases, I
elaborated the rarely noted but generally applied "independently
sufficient non-liable condition" limitation on the extent of responsi-
bility for tortiously caused consequences:
The successive-injury cases have engendered much debate and confusion, particu-
larly in the Commonwealth countries, where the legal community seems unable to
free itself from the but-for concept of causation. The causal situation is clear in
these cases. The first injury caused the [harm at issue]; the second did not. The is-
sue is not causal. It is a proximate-cause issue of policy or principle that is most
appropriately placed under the heading of damages, and it also arises in the dupli-
cative-causation cases. The issue is whether a defendant who has tortiously caused
injury to the plaintiff nevertheless should be absolved from liability if the injury
would have occurred anyway as a result of independent duplicative or preempted
conditions.
Courts generally absolve the defendant from liability if he proves that the injury
would have occurred anyway as a result of independent nontortious conditions. In
such a case, the plaintiffs corrective-justice claim-that he would not have been
injured if not for the tortious conduct of others-fails. On the other hand, if the
duplicative or preempted conditions also resulted from tortious conduct, the plain-
tiffs corrective-justice claim is intact.
177
175. Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 3, at 1018-19.
176. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1798-1801.
177. Id. at 1798 (footnotes omitted). Stapleton seems to agree that the defendant should be
(and is) held liable if and only if the independently sufficient condition was also tortious. She
assumes that the law would be "brought into disrepute" if a plaintiff injured by two tortfeasors
were treated worse (by being denied recovery) than a plaintiff injured by a single tortfeasor, and
she suggests that "the legal concern with upholding the 'dignity of the law' outweighs concerns
with deterrence, fairness to defendants, and so on" which she assumes would argue against
holding the defendant liable. Stapleton, supra note 1, at 967-68, 1007 & n.175; see Stapleton,
Perspectives, supra note 2, at 81, 83 n.57. But cf. Stapleton, supra note 1, at 968 ("Cases of se-
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Stapleton now admits that there is a "first-level" empirical
issue of causal contribution in the over-determined-causation cases,
even when the facts in those cases are known or agreed upon. How-
ever, she continues to state that the "characteristic problem" in
these cases is not the empirical issue of causal contribution but
rather the normative issue of individual responsibility for any tor-
tiously caused consequences. 178 Citing her previous essay, she as-
serts:
The scientific-derived notion of historical involvement and the targeted but-for test
of historical involvement emphasize the processes that create the elements of the
setting in which the conduct is seen, the various choices of perspective we have
about how a piece of conduct might be viewed, and the importance of irrevocably
narrowing a victim's 'expectancies."7
Insofar as she treats these various "perspectives" and "expectan-
cies" as aspects of the empirical causal-contribution inquiry, rather
than as aspects of the analytically prior tortious-conduct and legal-
injury inquiries which frame or focus the causal-contribution in-
quiry, 80 her targeted but-for test not only is inadequate as a test of
empirical causal contribution, but it also fails properly to distin-
guish the empirical issue of causal contribution from the normative
issues that also enter into determinations of legal responsibility.
D. The Over-Determined Multiple-Omission Cases
As I indicated in my first article on causation, some of the
most difficult over-determined-causation cases, at least conceptu-
ally, are those involving multiple omissions, which usually involve
failures to attempt to use missing or defective safety devices or
failures to attempt to read or heed missing or defective instructions
quential over-determination by multiple pieces of tortious conduct lie between these two ex-
tremes and, not unexpectedly, provoke varying responses from the law.") It is not clear to me
why the formal "dignity" of the law should outweigh substantive fairness and efficiency concerns,
or why the law's "dignity" is not similarly impugned when a plaintiff injured by a tortfeasor and
an "act of god" is treated worse than a plaintiff injured solely by a tortfeasor. On the other hand.
I do not understand why it would be unfair to defendants to hold multiple tortfeasors liable for
an injury for which each was an independently sufficient tortious cause. In such a situation,
fairness and justice support liability, as do efficient-deterrence considerations. However, con-
trary to the cases and the corrective-justice principle, efficient-deterrence considerations also
support liability even when the injury would have occurred anyway due to a non-fortious condi-
tion. See Wright, Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 445-48; Wright Efficiency Thcory, supra
note 3, at 571-72.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 137-140.
179. Stapleton, supra note 1, at 959 n.42 (citations omitted).
180. See supra note 32.
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or warnings. 8 1 Some actual cases include Weeks v. McNulty, 182 in
which a hotel negligently failed to provide a fire escape, but the de-
ceased hotel guest failed to check outside the window for a fire es-
cape or other escape route; Saunders System Birmingham Co. v.
Adams, 8 3 in which a car rental company negligently failed to dis-
cover or repair bad brakes before renting a car to a driver, but the
driver negligently failed to apply the brakes to avoid running into a
pedestrian; Rouleau v. Blotner18 4 in which a driver (allegedly) neg-
ligently failed to signal before turning in front of another driver's
oncoming car, but the second driver was not looking and would not
have seen any signal if it had been given; and Safeco Insurance Co.
v. Baker,185 in which a manufacturer sold a prefabricated fireplace
with inadequate installation instructions, but the carpenter who
improperly installed the fireplace did not read any of the manufac-
turer's instructions.
In each of these cases and many other similar cases, the
courts held that the company or person who negligently failed to
provide the proper safeguard (safety device or warning) was not
legally responsible for the plaintiffs injury, since the negligent fail-
ure was not an actual cause of the injury.186 These holdings reflect a
common, tacit understanding of empirical causation in such situa-
tions: the failure to provide a proper safeguard has no causal effect
when there was or would have been no attempt to use the safe-
guard, unless there was no attempt because it was known that the
safeguard did not exist or was inadequate.
87
Will any of the causal tests enable us to explain these causal
judgments? The first person's failure to provide a proper safeguard
would have been a but-for (necessary) cause of the plaintiffs injury
if the reason that the second person did not try to use the safeguard
was because she knew that the safeguard did not exist or was defec-
tive. However, in each case it was assumed or proven that the sec-
ond person would not have tried to use the safeguard even if it had
181. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1801.
182. Weeks v. McNulty, 48 S.W. 809 (Tenn. 1898).
183. Saunders Sys. Birmingham Co. v. Adams, 117 So. 72 (Ala. 1928).
184. Rouleau v. Blotner, 152 A. 916 (N.H. 1931).
185. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Baker, 515 So. 2d 655 (La. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 519 So. 2d 130
(La. 1988); see McWilliams v. Sir William Arrol & Co., 1962 Sess. Cas. 70 (H.L.), [1962] 1 All E.R.
623 (similar facts and result); Fischer, supra note 29, at 1352-56 (discussing and citing a largo
number of cases with similar facts and results).
186. Saunders, 117 So. at 74; Safeco, 515 So. 2d at 657-58; Rouleau, 152 A. at 916; Weeks, 48
S.W. at 812.
187. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1763 n.117, 1785 n.212, 1801 & n.277.
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been properly supplied. Thus, neither omission considered by itself
was a but-for (necessary) cause since, without it, the injury still
would have occurred due to the other omission.
Yet it clearly is incorrect to conclude that neither omission
was a cause, 188 since (applying the aggregate but-for test) in the ab-
sence of both omissions the plaintiff would not have been injured.8 9
Thus, although neither omission by itself was a but-for (necessary)
cause, at least one and perhaps each of them must have been an
independently sufficient cause. Unfortunately, as in the multiple-
act cases, the aggregate but-for test cannot tell us whether (1) both
omissions were duplicative independently sufficient causes or (2)
only one omission actually was independently sufficient and pre-
empted the potential causal effect of the other omission.190
In my initial article on causation, I attempted to apply the
NESS test to explain our causal judgments and the courts' holdings
in these multiple-omission safeguard cases, using the defective-
brake case as an example:
D's failure to try to use the brakes was necessary for the sufficiency of a set of ac-
tual antecedent conditions that [does] not include C's failure to repair the brakes,
and the sufficiency of this set was not affected by C's failure to repair the brakes.
A failure to try to use brakes will have a negative causal effect whether or not the
brakes are defective. On the other hand, C's failure to repair the brakes was not a
necessary element of any set of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for
the occurrence of the injury. Defective brakes will have an actual causal effect only
if someone tries to use them, but that was not an actual condition here. The poten-
tial negative causal effect of Cs failure to repair the brakes was preempted by D's
failure to try to use them.I19
At the time that I wrote this explanation, I was aware that it was
too brief and cryptic, relied upon an insufficiently elaborated notion
of causal sufficiency and "negative causal effect," and therefore
could seemingly be reversed to support the opposite causal conclu-
sions merely by switching the references to the two omissions. Nev-
ertheless, I thought it roughly stated the correct analysis in very
abbreviated form.
The seeming reversibility of my explanation has been noted
by others, including David Fischer. 9 2 Concluding that neither the
NESS test nor any other suggested test of causation properly re-
188. Contra ARNO C. BECHT & FRANK NV. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN
NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES 82 n.116, 95-98, 210-11 (1961); WILLIAM L. PROSSER.
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 239.40 n.25 (4th ed. 1971). For my previous discussion of
these sources, see Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1787 & n.223.
189. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14, at 267 n.27, 268-69.
190. See supra note 141.
191. Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1801 (footnote omitted).
192. Fischer, supra note 29, at 1357-59.
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solves the empirical causation issue in these over-determined dou-
ble-omission safeguard cases, Fischer assumes that there is no
purely empirical causal issue in these cases-that "[i]n such cases
causation is not a purely factual matter" but rather a matter of
"policy unrelated to causation in fact."193 However, perhaps due to
his recognition of the fundamental nature of the actual-causation
requirement in tort law,194 Fischer employs phrasing which implies
that, in every over-determined multiple-omission case, both omis-
sions were actual causes, so that the only issue that needs to be re-
solved is the normative issue of legal responsibility. 195 Indeed, he
describes all over-determined-causation cases, including those in-
volving multiple acts such as multiple negligently set fires, as "mul-
tiple-sufficient-cause" cases. 196 This phrasing is appropriate only
when all the acts or omissions were (duplicative) actual causes, but
not when one preempted the potential causal effect of the others, as
when one fire arrived and burned down a house hours before the
second fire arrived. Although the second fire would have been suffi-
cient to burn the house down if the first fire had not already de-
stroyed the house, it was not actually sufficient because the first
fire had already destroyed the house. Thus, to describe all over-
determined-causation cases as "multiple-sufficient-cause" cases, as
Fischer does, is inaccurate and highly misleading. 197
193. Id. at 1359-60; cf. id. at 1335 (stating that over-determined multiple-omission cases that
"create extremely difficult cause-in-fact problems. . . [which] [c]ourts can solve ... satisfactorily
only by reference to policy; pure factual analysis simply does not provide an adequate answer.").
Stapleton adopts Fischer's thesis but expands it to encompass all over-determined-causation
cases. See supra note 172 and text accompanying notes 164-71 & 178-80.
194. See Fischer, supra note 29, at 1335.
195. For example, in the unused-defective-brakes case, Fischer states that "both omissions
were independently sufficient to cause the accident." Id. at 1349.
196. E.g., id. at 1336 & n.3.
197. Fischer also claims that, even when there is no causal over-determination, the causal
analysis in cases involving omissions is always more difficult than in cases involving acts be.
cause the chain of causal reasoning is always at least one step longer for an omission than an
act. Comparing the negligent act of operating a steam locomotive given dangerous weather
conditions with the negligence of failing to install a spark arrester on the locomotive, Fischer
states that, while the causal analysis for the act involves the two issues of (i) whether a spark
from the locomotive landed on the plant that first caught fire and (ii) whether the spark started
the fire, the causal analysis for the omission involves those two issues plus the issue of whether
the spark arrester would have prevented the escape of the spark. Id. at 1341-43. However, the
negligent act is not simply the operation of the locomotive but rather its operation in the danger-
ous weather conditions, and it must be established that each necessary element in the descrip-
tion of the negligent act, including the dangerous weather conditions, contributed to the burning
of the brush. See supra note 45. So the causal analysis of the negligent act must include the
additional issue(s) of whether the spark would have landed on the plant and started the fire oven
if the weather had not been dangerous. Moreover, Fischer's illustration does not compare simi-
larly situated acts and omissions. An act comparable to the omission of the spark arrestor would
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Fischer briefly considers, as an alternative to the merging of
the empirical-causation and normative-responsibility issues in the
over-determined multiple-omission cases, the possibility that causa-
tion in such cases is "a question to be resolved on the basis of hu-
man intuition about causation that is not reflected in the mechani-
cal tests of causation."19 8 He initially suggests a notion of "temporal
sequence," according to which "people may attribute cause to the
second omitter [the person who failed to try to use the safeguard]
because the second omitter's negligence occurs closest in time to the
accident." 9 9 He observes that this notion would be consistent with
the results in almost all the unused-missing-safeguard cases, which
treat the failure to try to use the safeguard as a cause but not the
temporally prior failure to provide a proper safeguard.200 However,
he concludes that "[t]he presence of such an intuitive sense appears
unlikely... [because] it does not explain all the cases."20 1 He men-
tions two cases, Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank of Mon-
tana202 and Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,203 in which the courts
held that the jury could find that the first omission, the failure to
provide a proper warning, was a "substantial factor" in causing the
plaintiffs injury.20 4
The "last omitter" notion also would fail to explain the dif-
ferent intuitive response that most people have to Hart and
Honor6's examples of concurrent, causally independent omissions:
[S]uppose that two switches need to be turned off in order to avert a fire, and that
X has a duty to turn off one, Y the other [but] neither does so and a fire which
would have been averted had they both performed their duty breaks out .... Sup.
pose, again, that a house can be built and profitably sold only if X delivers bricks
and Y mortar [but] both.., default in delivery so that the projected house cannot
be built and sold .... [L]awyers and ordinary people would agree in saying...
that the omission of each is causally relevant to the ensuing harm and that each
could in a proper case be held responsible for it.20
be the damaging of an existing spark arrester. For this act, as with the omission, the issue
would arise of whether an undamaged spark arrester would have prevented the escape of the
spark. Fischer's assumption that the causal analysis of omissions is more likely than the causal
analysis of acts to require consideration of hypothetical human responses, see Fischer, supra note
29, at 1343-44, is also questionable.
198. Fischer, supra note 29, at 1359-60.
199. Id. at 1360-61.
200. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 182-87.
201. Fischer, supra note 29, at 1361.
202. Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank, 789 P.2d 567, 575 (Mont. 1990).
203. Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 560-61 (3d Cir. 1990), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
204. See Fischer, supra note 29, at 1351-52, 1360.
205. HART & HONORt, supra note 34, at 128; see id. at 236.
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Hart and Honor6 use their version of the NESS test to support
these causal judgments.206 Fischer cites Hart and Honore's resolu-
tion of the two-switch hypothetical and asserts that it is inconsis-
tent with their refusal (consistent with the cases) to treat the fail-
ure to provide a proper safeguard as being a cause of an injury
when there was no attempt to use the safeguard.20 7
Yet Fischer himself obliquely suggests a distinction between
the two-switches hypothetical and the unused-missing-safeguard
cases. The distinction is not mere temporal sequence, but rather
that, "[iln the missing-safeguard case[s], [to prevent the injury] one
act (providing the safeguard) must take place before the other (us-
ing the safeguard)."208 The notion is one of causal sequence or pri-
ority, rather than mere temporal sequence, but the causal sequence
or priority is the reverse of how Fischer states it. The causal se-
quence for the operation of a safeguard is initiated when a person
attempts to use the safeguard and then subsequently proceeds, as a
result of such attempt, with the activation of the safeguard if the
safeguard is present and in proper condition. That is, the activation
of the safeguard depends on someone's first attempting to use it, so
that if no such attempt is made, "the [temporally] first omission
[the failure to provide a working safeguard] is not causal because it
never came into play."20 9
There is no such causal priority in the two-switches case, in
which the operation of each switch is not dependent on the prior
operation of the other switch, but rather each switch operates inde-
pendently of the other switch. There also is no such causal priority
among the potentially contributing conditions in the Kitchen
Krafters case, in which the defendant bank negligently failed to
provide material financial information to the plaintiff, but the bank
argued that the plaintiffs loss of business would have occurred
anyway due to a poor economy. 210 Nor is there any such causal pri-
ority in the Cipollone case, in which the defendant cigarette com-
pany negligently failed to provide adequate warnings about the
dangers of cancer both before and after 1966, when state causes of
206. See id. at 128 n.33.
207. See Fischer, supra note 29, at 1356-57 (citing HART & HONOR9, supra note 34, at 127,
128 & n.33, 235-36).
208. Id. at 1360.
209. Id. at 1361.
210. Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank, 789 P.2d 567, 575 (Mont. 1990). Note that
Kitchen Krafters is not even a double-omission case, since the "poor economy" is not an omission.
Moreover, unlike the unused-defective-safeguard cases, it is assumed that the plaintiff would
have paid attention to and acted on the information if it had been provided.
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action for failure to warn were preempted by federal law.211 Thus,
the notion of causal priority does seem to factually distinguish the
unused-missing-safeguard cases, in which the courts treat the fail-
ure to try to use the safeguard but not the failure to provide a
proper safeguard as a cause of the injury, from those cases in which
the courts are willing to consider both omissions as causes.
Fischer asserts that anything "inherent in human intuition"
about causation (such as the notion of causal priority described
above) which would explain our common judgments and the courts'
holdings on causation in the double-omission cases "is not reflected
in the mechanical tests of causation," including the NESS test.21
2
This is true if the NESS test is viewed "mechanically" as requiring
mere analytical or empirical sufficiency. But it is not true if the test
is properly understood as incorporating a concept of causal suffi-
ciency, which requires the complete instantiation of the potentially
applicable causal generalization,213 and if proper attention is paid
to the distinction between positive and negative causal effects and
the need to take into account any causal priority within an applica-
ble causal generalization when assessing negative rather than posi-
tive causal effects.
The distinction between positive and negative causal effects
was noted by Mill in his elaboration of the concept of causation that
underlies the NESS test:
[The failure of a sentry to be at his post] was no producing cause [of the army's
being surprised by the enemy], but the mere absence of a preventing cause: it was
simply equivalent to his non-existence. From nothing, from a mere negation, no
consequences can proceed. All effects are connected, by the law of causation, with
some set of positive conditions; negative ones, it is true, being almost always re-
quired in addition. In other words, every fact or phenomenon which has a begin-
ning invariably arises when some certain combination of positive facts exists, pro-
vided certain other positive facts do not exist....
The cause then, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of conditions positive
and negative taken together; the whole of the contingencies of every description,
which being realised, the consequent invariably follows. The negative conditions,
however, of any phenomenon, a special enumeration of which would generally be
very prolix, may be all summed up under one head, namely, the absence of pre-
venting or counteracting causes.
214
Consider the victims' deaths by shooting or dehydration,
rather than by poisoning, in the poisoned-tea and desert-traveler
211. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 546, 561 (3d Cir. 1990).
212. Fischer, supra note 29, at 1360-61; see id. at 1359.
213. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
214. MILL, supra note 131, bk. III, ch. V, § 3.
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hypotheticals. 15 In each hypothetical, the victim was bound to die
soon, once the deadly poison with no antidote was put into the vic-
tim's cup or keg (from which the victim was certain to drink unless
killed first or deprived of the liquid in the keg, respectively). The
then-existing set of conditions was analytically and empirically suf-
ficient for the victim's death within a short time. But it was not
(causally) sufficient for the victim's death by poisoning. The omni-
bus negative condition, the absence of any "preventing or counter-
acting" cause, was not satisfied. In each hypothetical, the occur-
rence of one of the necessary positive conditions in the causal gen-
eralization for death by poisoning-the drinking of the poison-was
prevented by a counteracting positive condition: the shooting of the
victim in the poisoned-tea hypothetical and the emptying of the keg
in the desert-traveler hypothetical.
Now consider the failure-to-brake case. The braking, if it oc-
curs, is a counteracting positive condition that prevents the com-
plete instantiation of the causal generalization for running over the
pedestrian. In the usual case in which the brakes are successfully
operated, both the driver's applying the brakes and the brakes' be-
ing in proper working order are concrete instantiations of different
necessary positive conditions in the completely instantiated causal
generalization for braking, and thus are NESS causes (and, in this
situation, also but-for causes) of the successful operation of the
brakes. The fact that, in the applicable causal generalization, the
driver's attempting to use the brakes is causally prior to the "com-
ing into play" of the brakes' being in proper working order need not
be noted, since both conditions actually came into play.
However, when the situation is one in which we are at-
tempting to identify the causes of the brakes' not being operated-
that is, a failure of the causal generalization for braking, which is a
"negative causal effect" rather than the positive causal effect dis-
cussed in the prior paragraph-the causal priority becomes signifi-
cant and must be taken into account when applying the NESS test.
The failure of any causal generalization is logically or empirically
guaranteed to occur if any one of the necessary positive conditions
in the antecedent of the causal generalization is absent. Yet, the
failure can be explained causally only by taking into account any
relevant causal priority among those positive conditions. The ab-
sence of any causally prior necessary condition preempts the possi-
ble coming into play (through presence or absence) of any other
215. See supra text accompanying notes 144-51.
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necessary condition in the causal generalization, the operation of
which was causally subsequent to or dependent upon the causally
prior necessary condition. On the other hand, if, as in the two-
switches hypothetical, there is no causal priority among the multi-
ple absent necessary conditions, then each absent necessary condi-
tion is a duplicative cause of the failure of the causal generaliza-
tion.
V. CONCLUSION
When I began writing this Article, I intended to devote con-
siderable space to the issues encompassed by the Restatement's
second requirement for an actor's tortious conduct to be a "legal
cause" of the plaintiffs injury: that there be "no rule of law reliev-
ing the actor from liability because of the manner in which his neg-
ligence has resulted in the harm."216
This topic is generally referred to as "proximate causation,"
and unfortunately it continues to be referred to as such in Gary
Schwartz's draft of the Third Restatement. 217 As I previously indi-
cated, I strongly agree with Stapleton that the phrases "proximate
cause" and "legal cause," and other phrases that confusingly merge
the empirical issue of causal contribution with the normative issue
of the extent of legal responsibility for tortiously caused conse-
quences, should be replaced with terminology that clearly distin-
guishes these two issues. 218 The confusion of these two issues,
which is widespread and deep, sometimes traps even those, like
Stapleton, who are most desirous of avoiding it.
In this Article, I have once again jumped into the bramble
bush in an attempt to prune away some of the confusion. 2 9 Unfor-
tunately, I also have once again found that (more than?) my allotted
amount of space has been used up in merely trying to clarify the
empirical issue of causal contribution and to distinguish it from the
various normative issues that precede and follow it in the analysis
of a tort claim. Thus, at this point, I will only state my disagree-
ment with the general view, apparently shared by Stapleton,220 that
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431(b) (1965).
217. Discussion Draft, supra note 49, § 3 cmt. a C 'Legal cause' includes the doctrines of both
actual cause and proximate cause, as they are set forth elsewhere in this General Principles
Restatement.").
218. See supra text accompanying notes 4-36.
219. See Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 3, at 1002-03.
220. Stapleton states that, "[i]n most situations, the law's concerns are simply factors ... for
the decision-maker to have in mind." Stapleton, supra note 1, at 981; see id. at 984-86, 1007-09
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it is hopeless to try to articulate any definite, workable rules that
limit the extent of legal responsibility for tortiously caused conse-
quences.
I believe that there are at least three definite, workable limi-
tations, each of which, if found to exist, will limit the defendant's
(or plaintiffs) legal responsibility for tortiously (or negligently)
caused injury: (1) the injury would almost certainly have occurred
anyway as a result of a non-liable condition; (2) there was a super-
seding (intervening, necessary, and highly unexpected) cause of the
injury; or (3) the injury did not occur as part of the playing out of
one of the foreseeable risks which made the person's conduct tor-
tious (or negligent). Further elaboration of these three limitations
and the extent to which they are recognized, ignored, or confused in
the Restatement must await the separate publication of what origi-
nally was meant to be the second half of this Article.
& n.191. She states that there rarely may be "crystallized rules" for certain torts, id. at 987, but
she mentions only two and questions both. The first, for the tort of negligence, is that "foresee-
ability (of the kind/type/nature of the harm suffered)" supposedly is "a necessary requirement,"
but she immediately remarks that this is "a notoriously malleable 'rule' that will rarely provide
control because it crucially depends on how broadly or narrowly the kind/type/nature of the harm
is described." Id.; see id. at 997 C'what is critical to the law is not some independent general
quality of an outcome, the foreseeability or directness of its type/manner/extent, all of which can
be manipulated to cover virtually any result that is desired"). She also refers to an unolaboratod
"crystallized rule" in cases of "simultaneous over-determination by tortfeasors," id. at 1007, but
previously she had denied that any general rule applies to such cases, see id. at 968. She rejects
any distinct superseding-cause limitation. See id. at 999 & n.151.
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